Year Fourteen in Review

I subtitled last year’s review “More Philosophy, Less Politics.” The distinction that I drew between “politics” and “philosophy” was not mean to suggest that philosophy has no political implications, but that the province of its interests is wider than the collective governance of the public sphere and the social forces that shape it. It was more an expression of my own desire to think more broadly and deeply about the problems of human life that originally drew me into philosophy: Is life meaningful? must it be meaningful to be worth living? what are the implications for the value of our lives of the fact that we evolved through a series of happy accidents and that death equals annihilation; but also, in the age of Chat-GPT, what remains distinctive about human experience and thought?; what is the value of work in a period where we can imagine intelligent machines doing everything for us?; what is the difference between human creativity and the machinic assemblage of sentences and images?; how can philosophers cultivate the desire to think and create in the age of advancing AI?; how can we cultivate a taste for the “mistake” in the age where one-dimensional machine perfection is the norm?

My goal was only partially realized. i was able to think out loud about problems that interest me as a philosopher and I reviewed more books than I normally do. I enjoy engaging with the works of other thinkers and writers; reviewing books is an excellent lesson in intellectual humility. A good review should, I think, draw out the truth of the text and never lecture or scold about what the author should have written (i.e., the book you would have written). But– and I blame the world– I kept getting dragged back to problems of social organization Since the current structures and forces of global and national life-organization are directly responsible for killing masses of human beings and systematically depriving hundreds of millions of others of even the most basic necessities of dignified and enjoyable life, one cannot be interested in questions of the meaning and value of life and the reconciliation of different world views and ignore the political realities of world.

Those realities grow darker by the minute. As I write Israel and Iran continue to lob missiles at each other. From afar, the absurdity is apparent and the adolescent-boy tough talk from both sides nauseating. The alternative is so simple: trust and talk. (If Trump really were the tough guy he pretends to be he would take on a really difficult task: threatening to ut off all weapons to Israel until it begins to abide by international law and negotiate a seriously with the Palestinians).

Alas, Trump is mostly talk and politics- as I discussed in a few different posts last year– does not obey the logic of objective rationality.

Case in point: millions of American workers once again voted for a billionaire property developer and showman, thinking that he will protect their interests. In the not yet 6 months that he has been in office, Donald Trump has unleashed the worst of human instincts on his country and the world. His administration continues to aid and abet war criminal behaviour in Israel, indulges in the xenophobic projection of the causes of all social problems onto a demonized other, unapologetically uses state violence to attack internal enemies, and openly collapses the difference between state interests and personal ambition (a hallmark of totalitarianism across historical time). Perhaps worst of all, Trump’s undisguised assaults on liberal-democratic institutions has been supported by a pervasive mindlessness and open disdain for empirical truths and principled consistency of position that makes his administration impervious to rational argument.

Philosophy is reflective and historical and not a future-oriented predictive science, but I feel confident in saying that Trump is a symptom and not the cause of a dying world. The old world was riddled with contradictions that are now exploding alongside Israel’s and Iran’s bombs: the contradiction between a global economy and an international political system divided into nations states; the contradiction between the capitalist need for growth and the finite resources of the planet; the class contradictions between a ruling class appropriating ever more wealth for itself and the majority subsisting on less and less, in more and more precarious circumstances, and the even wider chasm between the wealth and energy consumption of the Global North and the Global South. The problem solving capacities of the old institutional order have been exhausted.

Philosophy cannot predict the future nor can it solve the problems it studies. The number one duty of the philosopher is to try to understand. It seems inhuman to try to grasp causes as objectively and dispassionately as possible when people are suffering and dying. But if change requires clear understanding of causes then philosophy serves the mission of promoting universal understanding best when it takes the side of evidence and truth against all one-sided ideologies and fundamentalisms and refuses to uncritically cheerlead political movements. The truth is: wars kill, lack of food and sanitation kills, lack of education chokes the development of cognitive and creative potential, ideologically contrived hatreds keep tyrants in power and impoverish the world. Philosophy takes the side of those truths. Its ultimate goal is to promote mutual understanding between groups who agree on those basic facts of life. Mutual understanding is a virtuous circle of reciprocal learning, expanded intelligence, and shard joy at being alive together. The blog will continue to advance that goal as best I can.

Thanks to my readers and those who contribute through their comments. As with years past I have left a few of the less context-dependent of last year’s posts up and all have been collected– just because I like collecting things– and published here.

American Barometer Rising

Protests that began in Los Angeles against ICE immigration sweeps have spread across the United States. Trump’s decision to mobilize the California National Guard and put 700 Marines on stand by has not dampened but catalyzed the simmering opposition to ICE’s made-for-TV immigration raids. (There is no Baudrillardian postmodern exaggeration in this claim: Dr. Phil of all people was embedded with the ICE agents that conduced the initial raids that sparked the protests in LA). Trump’s almost immediate resort to deploying troops raises the suspicion that the architects of his immigration policy have been hoping to provoke confrontations that could justify sending in the army–constitutional or not– but whether planned, semi-planned, or spontaneous, the rapidity with which Trump has unleashed the hounds supports those who warned that Trump’s authoritarian and even fascist tendencies would be given full vent in his second administration.

The response of Trump’s supporters to the troop deployment has been sadly predictable: the Republican members of the “land of the free” see no problem in deploying soldiers against largely peaceful protests and refuse to contest the nonsensical rhetoric of “insurrection.” The troops themselves apparently have a clearer view of the political reality of their deployment. According to a number of advocacy groups who speak for deployed soldiers (who cannot comment on their mission while on active duty), they resent being used as pawns in Trump’s political games. (Unfortunately, resentment is not refusal to obey orders of questionable constitutional legality. Perhaps some courageous few will emerge if these deployments spread).

I must admit that I have been guilty of underestimating the dangers that Trump poses to liberal-democratic institutions. Robert Reich was right and I was wrong: Trump 2.0 is a five alarm fire threatening to burn down American democracy. My earlier analyses of his re-election focused too much on the economic disaffection of his working class supporters and downplayed the appeal of his authoritarianism. But this fact can no longer be denied: In the five months since his election his administration is openly totalitarian. They have attacked the independence of academia and the scientific community; they have deployed armed thugs against a demonized “enemy within,” with “illegal immigrant” playing the role of “Jew” in 1930s Germany; they have openly argued that the function of the legislative and judicial branches of government is to obediently implement the executive’s agenda; they have called for the arrest or removal of democratically elected and legally legitimate politicians and judges who oppose that agenda; they have torn up public sector collective agreements and unapologetically purged the federal bureaucracy of administrators and workers whose job it is to study threats to human health and the environment, regulate business, and ensure respect for labour and environmental law, and they have gleefully dismantled the limited gains of historically oppressed groups in the form of affirmative action principles and employment equity legislation.

Radical social critics can easily list all the limitations and failures of each of these liberal-democratic institutions and legislative reforms, but liberal-democratic institutions and legislative reforms have the merit of being real while a world without borders or fully developed communism are just ideas. The inadequacies of liberal-democratic institutions are manifold, but they are also plateaus of achievement of past social struggles: one reaches the summit of the mountain not by blowing it up but by moving from plateau to plateau.

Trump has once again beaten his critics, mainstream or radical, to the punch. Troops are on the ground in LA and Austin, TX while Trump’s critics criticize and are left to fight rearguard actions in court. People outside of and to the left of the Democratic Party will see in these protests signs of generalized radicalization, just as they did when Black Lives Matter protests swept the country during Trump’s first term. But those protests taught a different lesson: demonstrations on their own do not put forward policy alternatives or portend the formation of new, internally cohesive, and, above all politically disciplined political movements.

The widespread and militant nature of the BLM protests had some commentators talking of an “uprising,” as if America were entering into a pre-revolutionary period. But without any organized political vehicle to formulate an alternative political, economic, and social agenda that could win support beyond those, mostly young people, inspired to demonstrate, the protests were bound to fizzle out, as in fact they did. Trump has learned from those protests (and also from the campus anti-Israel protests) that violent state repression of demonized opponents is a powerful mobilizing tool that solidifies rather than weakens his base. Hyperbolic rhetorical inflation of threats that go unchallenged by Trump’s Congressional supporters reinforce the feelings in MAGA-world that the US has been invaded. Democrats like John Fetterman exacerbate the problem when they mouth platitudes about the right to protest but condemn actual demonstrations of anger and opposition. When they corroborate Trump’s fantastical construction of these protests as insurrectionary violence in an effort to appear politically “responsible,” they play into Trump’s hand. Political responsibility in times demands that people stand up against the naked dehumanization of immigrants and Palestinians by Trump and his handlers and enablers. Even those unmoved by the plight of Trump’s targets ought to be alarmed by the spillover effects of militarized policing and surveillance on their own share of endlessly vaunted American freedoms.

That said, it remains true that fundamental social transformations result from the institutionalization of collectively generated creative intelligence, not the spontaneous venting of righteous anger. Eventually– as in BLM or Occupy before that– people have to go back to work, a necessity that can be hastened by steadily intensifying state repression. Only a relatively small minority of people are willing to persistently demonstrate, blockade, and occupy public space. A smaller minority are willing to risk arrest fighting night after night with the police. And an even smaller minority will be willing to face down fully armed soldiers.

Trump, or Trump’s advisors, study history and know these facts. He is banking on the hope that his rapid deployment of troops will separate the hardcore from the genuinely-concerned-but-not-willing-to-risk-it-all majority, put a quick an end to these protests, and burnish his image as decisive, willing-to-do-what it takes leader. While the initial response to his decision to mobilize the national Guard and Marines has been admirably defiant, one should not be misled into thinking that these actions alone are going to de-rail Trump.

The problem that opponets of Trump face is that they are not members of a single, internally unified, coherent, political movement or party. It is important to take back the language of “democracy” from Trump, but it is even more important to have a program that can win support and make concrete changes in the here and now. The left needs more than slogans and street energy; it needs a political program with concrete short term and long term objectives and a credible project that explains how those changes will actually address the anxieties that have drive some workers to Trump. Trump classically acknowledges those anxieties and displaces the cause from system dynamics to a dehumanized other. The left has to refocus on the system and explain what causes millions of people to risk humiliation and arrest to come to America. But even more than this program and project and refocusing of the terms of the debate on system-dynamics, the American left needs a party that can win power and use it to implement that program. Trump proves that state power matters. But who on the left is capable of taking state power and using it to implement an agenda that does not exist?

There is no point expending energy to prove that fundamental change is impossible. On the other hand, there is a point to highlighting the weakness of the American left. The left of the Democratic Party has made the right arguments, but they are trapped in debilitating tension with the party establishment and this conflict prevents them from developing the sort of program that could break the section of the American working class bewitched by MAGA propaganda from Trump. If Trump’s tearing up the collective agreements of federal workers did not wake the union movement up to the fact that a billionaire property developer with authoritarian politics is not the friend of workers, even if his tariffs result in a steel mill or two re-opening, the arrest of David Huerta, President of the Service Employees International Union, certainly should. Union leaders have to be full throttle opponents of the Trump agenda, including his tariff project, even if it might satisfy some very short term interests of some section of the working class. The tariff agenda is about the forcible re-assertion of American hard power on the global stage, not restoring “good jobs” to America. Those jobs were good not because they were in steel mills but because they were unionized: people fought for the wages and benefits the first generation of steel workers did not enjoy. Does Sean Fein really think that Trump is a fan of unionized autoworkers?

But even more than a program, a project, and a party, the American left needs political discipline and this need, I fear, might be the most difficult to satisfy. Political discipline means accepting that decisions taken by a party or movement are absolutely binding on members. Once a decision has been taken after full and free debate, members of the movement publicly support it, work to realize it, and defend it against external opponents and critics. Trump is a sterling example of the power of political discipline. Whatever Republicans think about his strategy and tactics, they support it. The proof of the power is in the pudding: a candidate facing over 130 criminal charges won the Presidency and his party won both Houses of Congress. Opponents need analogous unity and discipline, but the continued influence of identity politics on the left will, I believe, make this necessary goal almost impossible to achieve.

No political movement can be both internally unified in support of a coherent program and be publicly representative of every different identity and group that makes it up. The place for arguing from particular perspectives is in the caucuses and debates through which policy and a program are formulated. Once votes have been cast and a policy supported, political discipline demands that internal factions, groups, and identities subordinate their disagreement or particular perspectives and support the democratically determined policy. But too often this unity disintegrates as soon as a project has been formulated because it purportedly fails to “represent” the interests of some group or other. Typically the leadership then acquiesces until all political coherence is lost. Gay and lesbian struggles used to be about the liberation of same sex desire from the oppressive shackles of legally enforced heteronormativity. What exactly does LGTBAQ2S+….. n stand for beyond the weakest and most vacuous liberal idea of “inclusion?”

The “horizontalism” and decentralization embodied by movements like Occupy and BLM failed as an alternative to democratic centralism. Maybe the Tik Tok generation will work out an alternative that works better than democratic centralism and political discipline as an institutional vehicle for political movements. I continue to believe that unless the diverse opponents of the right wing populist agenda agree on deep, substantive shared values and accept the need to work together to embed them in social institutions, the left will continually be outflanked by an opponent that learns from history and acts as one to impose its agenda.

When is Now, Where is Here?

I have just returned from a trip to Ireland with my brother. A friend and former student who now lives in Dublin informed us over drinks that our visit had been preceded by “Make Ireland Great Again” anti-immigrant protests. We missed the protests, but waiting for a bus in Galway an old timer staggered up to us and, clearly mistaking us for locals, asked “Whataya think, boys, it’s a small country, there’s too many of them,” and went on to complain about how some monument to the scared heart of Jesus or something had been taken down to avoid offending Muslim sensibilities, and how Saudi Arabia would never close down a mosque were the Irish to move en masse to Saudi Arabia. I am sure he is correct on the later score, but I doubt that it was Muslim immigrants who demanded the removal of the statue: I would bet a pint and a shot of whiskey that it was good old-fashioned white Irish liberals that took that step pre-emptively.

But make anything great again protests do pose an important question: when was the ‘x’ that has now declined great? And who were the y’s that made the x great? Was Ireland great when it was exclusively for the Irish? But when was that? Before the 9th century Viking invasions? So does the greatness of Ireland then consist in sod huts and peat digging? While street signs and official announcements are made in Irish and English and sheep there were aplenty, there was also excellent internet service and our Irish for the Irish friend in Galway did not appear to have just finished work in a bog. I am no expert, but I think that the economy in Ireland in the EU is a little better then when my ancestors left during the Great Famine.

Traditionalists wherever they are found urge history against avant garde’s and cosmopolitans. But history, like water, is a universal solvent: a continuous process of movement and change upon which politically motivated human beings project symbolic demarcations and arbitrary boundaries. Who are the Irish? The descendants of ancient Celts? But who are the Celts? They were not Irish, but originated in Central Europe. Unlike Plato’s founding myth of his kallipolis, the gods did not plant the souls of the people of country’s in the soil of the nation to which they just happen to belong. Wind the historical clock back far enough and one finds that everyone came from somewhere else.

Bloc Quebecois leader Yves Bechand argued towards the end of the most recent Canadian election that Canada was an “artificial” country. His comment set of a firestorm of outrage amongst the nouveau nationalists aroused to impassioned defence of the dignity of maple syrup and beavers by the effect of Trump’s talk of making Canada the 51st state. Bechand was, of course, correct, but what he failed to note is that every country is artificial. Bechand meant that Canada is not an ethnically uniform nation like Quebec, and there precisely lies the problem with all ethno-nationalisms: they must affirm an essentially exclusionary and, at the limits, racist understanding of the “nation’ (pur laine Quebecois, Irish with no trace of Viking, or Norman, or English blood) which an actually historical understanding of human development reveals to be mythological. Buddy in Galway thought that my brother and I were Irish because we look “Irish” in the way that the daughter of a Somali immigrant actually born and schooled in Ireland and therefore actually Irish does not.

Looks are deceiving.

If the Quebecois nation is “natural” as opposed to the artificially constructed Canadian nation, what exactly is Bechand to say to the Mohawks or Cree who were in “la belle provence” long before it was a province (although I am sure that it was still “belle”). Or Quebecois of Moroccan ancestory? Or a recent immigrant from Congo (or even a McGill student from Toronto)? If the Quebecois nation is natural they can at best be guest residents but never full and equal members of the nation.

Class: can anyone name another nation where this sort of ethno-chauvinism is causing some rather serious problems?

The “natural” Quebecois nation is the legacy of colonial conquest that started not all that long ago, 1628, when Champlain founded a permanent French settlement at Tadoussac at the confluence of the St. Lawrence and Saguenay rivers. Therefore, if Quebec is natural, the actual pre-European history of the peoples who lived there for thousands of years must be, by Bechand’s logic, an artificial graft onto the Quebecois nation: a complete inversion of reality. If one thinks historically, the naturalness of the “Quebecois” identity is exposed as an ex post facto construct of the descendants of people who were not Quebecois, but French. And the French nation that today people in North American regard as an ethno-national whole only dates from 1789 and was the product of a state-led struggle against regional identities and languages.

And so it goes. Unless one’s family has lived in the Rift Valley of eastern African where modern human beings evolved for the past 3 million years, one is the descendant of people who at one time moved from somewhere else. And even if your people have never moved from the spot where Lucy once roamed, our earliest ancestors were not people at all, but pre-human primates. And pre-human primates were once mammallian quadrupeds, and mammalian quadrupeds were once fish, and fish were once prokaryotic cells, and prokaryotic cells were once self-replicating amino acids, and self-replicating amino acids were once heavy elements blasted through space by supernovae eruptions, and stars were once swirls of hydrogen gas, and swirls of hydrogen gas were once …. nothing, the quantum vacuum.

The politically involved person is apt to think at this point: the philosophical mind has become untethered from human reality. History cannot be understood on cosmic time-scales and requires symbolic attachment, rootedness, community, identity. I respond: I used to think that way, and part of me still does, but the persistence of hatred and violence in the world perhaps calls for a more radical revision of how human beings understand themselves and their societies. The environmental movement has been trying to dislodge anthropocentric perspectives for decades, but what is more anthropocentric than the belief that the whole evolution of the universe was steered by the goal of planting one group of people on one patch of ground and another group on another patch? When we consider such ideas from the higher-level perspective of the evolution of matter and energy they appear as they really are: ludicrous.

The clock really does wind back to time t-0 and nothingness. I am becoming more and more convinced that there cannot be any solution to the most pressing social problems– including especially the violence generated by ideas about the fixity and naturalness of ethno-national identities – unless political thinking– left and right– understands the implications of deeply historical thinking.

Deeply historical thinking sets human history in the context of the history of the universe. It is anti-anthropocentric and anti-ethno-centric but at the same time humanist. From my perspective humanism begins from honest contemplation of the realities of human life: it is an evolutionary accident, had initial conditions been different we would not be here; after a certain (hopefully long) period of time we will not be here; we have developed certain capacities for world-building which are constrained, ultimately, only by the laws of physics, and so must figure out what to do with them. The problem with past answers to the question of what we should do with our world-building powers is that different human groups have taken the question of the truth of their worldviews far too seriously. Absurdities like gods become grounds for mass killing; instead of sharing the resources we all need some groups consider themselves uniquely entitled to the fruits of the earth; instead of seeing the human genius underlying different ways of life some groups exalt themselves as uniquely cultured, intelligent, scientific, indeed, human.

How stupid this chauvinism is from even one hundred miles above the earth, where not a single human artifact can be seen and no border lines are visible. Who cares who invented borscht or hummus? They are foods to eat not artefacts to be fought over. The only question is whether they are well-made or not. Whomever can read a recipe can cook. I am not preaching Esperanto abstract uniformity. I preach the gospel of invention, creativity, novelty, and iconoclasm. Before traditions were traditions they were inventions. If the logic insisted upon by defenders of tradition and “cultural authenticity” were followed strictly there would be no traditions, cultures, or human beings. The traditionalist says: do thing the way they have always been done. But deeply historical thinking, winding the clock all the way back, proves that in the beginning nothing was done, and so, if we were to do things the way they have were done in the past, we would have to do nothing at all.

Seeing the stupidity of fetishizing traditions and worshiping an imaginary authenticity we should laugh, not in love and malice, as Nietzsche argued, but in love and friendship, as the once celebrated but now too-ignored Epicurus argued. All were welcome in his garden: women, slaves, all were friends. The only rule was that they were not to talk about politics, because they rightly understood that life is too short for bickering about who should decided how it should be lived. each should decide for themselves. The only real problem is need-satisfaction which, if approached from the standpoint of friendship, in the midst of natural abundance and a minimally disciplined understanding of real needs, is no problem at all. Take what you need and leave as much and as good for others, as Locke argued the law of nature enjoined.

But, my politically-engaged friend will argue, “your deeply historical view abstracts from the structure of conflicts that make friendship impossible. How can the Gazan be friend to the Israeli, the worker to the boss, the black man to the racist?” I answer: “By ceasing to think of themselves as “Gazan” “Israeli” “worker,” “boss” “black man” “racist.” “But that is too abstract!” my comrade rejoins. And then I remind him that my thought that we should address each other as “friend” simply extends the logic of revolutionary modes of address: French revolutionaries called each other “citizen” and communists “comrade” precisely because these names abstracted from the social differences the revolution was trying to overthrow. I simply radicalize this spirit of egalitarian friendship.

“But what about justice,” my political friend insists. Well, what about it? What does the victim demand, vengeance, or access to the means of living well? I say that vengeance is one thing and justice is something else. Justice is (as I put it in the previous post) getting what one deserves. Vengeance is punishing an enemy for the wrongs that they have done. Vengeance is irrational because when one side satisfies its demand for vengeance it gives the other side grounds for demanding the same, and a never ending cycle of violence is unleashed. Justice is not about punishment but ensuring that the victims get what they deserve: secure access to the resources that they need to live and live well. Justice promotes friendly relations between former enemies, vengeance locks people into hate-fueled cycles of violence.

Contrary to the slogan on the wall in Galway pictured above, I argue that people need to remember to forget rather than not forget to remember. The best thing about a painful yesterday is that it is over. If one broods on the pain one will never be free from it, no matter what the circumstances of one’s life are. As Ursula LeGuin said somewhere, “To oppose is to maintain.” Forget, move on, take what you need and make a contribution to the common wealth. What problem would these ways of living and relating not solve if everyone were to put them into practice? Life-enjoyment is possible only in the present and progress demands that we look forward.

Time, Space, and Existential Injustice

The cry for justice is as old as recorded human thought. When people believe that they have been treated unfairly, they cry to their god or their comrades that justice must be served. In the most generic sense, justice exists when there is reciprocity between what the agent has done and the circumstances of their life. When circumstances are out of balance with the character and actions of the agents, then the cry of injustice is raised. The deep assumption that underlies the demand for justice that everyone should get what they deserve. This demand underlies the law of karma and the laws of the land; it informs ideas of the fairness of contracts and the legitimacy of democratic law-making.

Considered from a social perspective, justice in general takes on different concrete forms: criminal justice, economic justice, etc. Although theories differ, the sense of fairness at work in theories of social justice is easy enough to understand in terms of reciprocity between action and outcome. I follow the law, I should not be arrested; I upheld my side of the contract, I should get paid. But what about when there is no action on the part of the agent as the basis of the claim that they deserve something in return? Do human beings deserve anything simply in virtue of being born? If the answer is ‘yes,’ then I think we can talk meaningfully about “existential” justice.

I have been turning the idea of existential justice over in my head for years without really committing myself to trying to systematically unpack it. These reflections might be the beginning of a commitment to formally develop the idea, or they might be the end. In any case, they are offered here in the spirit of thinking out loud. But sometimes the thinking out loud is more important than rigorous argument. It can be the source of the intellectual energy of a philosophical idea that opens up a new perspective on an old problem.

Let us take a couple of concrete examples to begin the exploration of existential justice. Everyone will agree that there is such a thing as economic justice or criminal justice. Different political perspectives will provide different answers to what arrangement is actually just, but no one would agree that it is meaningless to ask what a defendant accused of a crime deserves or what a fair economic arrangement is. We might say that those charged with an offence deserve a fair trial and that those who work deserve to reap the fruit of their labours. In these concrete cases, ‘justice” is a function of interests generated by participation in a social institution. If there were no crime there would be no criminal justice system, and if we did not have to work on nature in order to produce the goods that we need and devise a means to distribute the products there would be no economic system and therefore no question about what economic agents deserve.

But since there are laws and we do have to produce and distribute the product of collective labour there are important questions about justice in these domains. But what would “existential” justice mean? If there is such a thing, then it would be the answer to the question of whether there is something human beings deserve simply in virtue of being born, i.e., coming into existence. I think that there is a meaningful answer to this question.

Since we do not choose to be born or to be the sort of organisms that we are, we come into the world requiring access to certain non-optional resources and goods. Thus, I think that it is meaningful to say that everyone born deserves to come into existence in social circumstances that ensure that their basic human life-requirements can be met. Those include the biologically obvious: nurture, shelter, clothing, but also the less physically quantifiable: care and love. Since we do not choose the identity that others will recognize us by I think one can also say that people deserve to be born into social and cultural contexts in which they will not suffer from belonging to a demonized and oppressed group. We are owed these things by the circumstances of life because no one chooses these life-requirements and they cannot, at least initially, satisfied them by their own individual efforts. Infants are not capable of working for the sake of satisfying their own needs or changing who they are. People who are born into situations of social collapse, war, systematic poverty and oppression against the group that they belong to are victims, I think, of existential injustice.

By calling it existential injustice I intend to put the stress on the circumstances and not the parents. Some people might reasonably argue that parents who conceive and give birth in war zones or racist regimes are causally responsible for the harms that their babies will suffer. But even if that response has some truth to it, it focuses on the parents and not the infant. Whatever the parents were doing or intending, once the infant exists it faces a set of problems it did not choose to face and cannot solve on its own: the very circumstances of its existence, therefor, are unjust. Whomever or whatever is causally responsible does not matter from the infant’s point of view. It emerges into a world that it cannot control but which poses serious threats to its present and future well-being. It does not deserve to suffer for social problems it had no role in creating. Everyone is therefore born, if this argument is correct, with a basic set of legitimate claims on life-protecting and health-promoting resources, institutions, and relationships. Any circumstances which systematically restrict access to these goods are existentially unjust.

Another way of putting that point would be to say that some social circumstances are inhuman because they impede the ability of parents or surrogates to care for the new life that is constantly coming into the world. There might be justice in punishing a criminal if they are guilty of a crime, but there can be no justification at all, ever, for imposing harms on infants who did not and could not choose to come into being. There can be no defence for existential injustice on grounds of political expediency or guilt on the part of the victim when the victims are one second old infants. They cannot be causally responsible for their emergence into existentially unjust, inhuman circumstances. Therefore, I conclude, every birth is a protest against existential injustice and a demand to transform the world so as to ensure that every child is born into a nurturing, caring, loving world,

Parents must of course think about the world into which they are bringing new humans, but if the human project is to continue then new people must be born. No group should be prevented or prevent themselves from bringing new life into the world because current conditions are existentially unjust. Birth is also a protest against inhuman conditions and hope in the problem solving capacities of human beings. Unless we want to voluntarily declare an end to the human project, agree to stop reproducing, and let ourselves peacefully die out, the solution to the inhuman conditions into which some people are born is to solve the problems, not to scold parents for bringing new life into the world. While the critters might be happy if human beings disappeared, our disappearance would risk allowing the only fully self-conscious beings in the universe to disappear thus cause a loss that might be a sort of existential injustice in its own right

In a sense, we are nature’s highest ‘creation.’ If there are other fully self-conscious beings in the universe, we have not discovered each other. If we go, we risk contributing to a universe in which there is no entity capable of fully valuing and honouring it. Only human beings, so far as we know, can value the universe aesthetically and scientifically and build higher unities of beauty and understanding through the creative work we alone are capable of doing. While it makes no sense to argue that we owe a debt to the Big Bang and blind evolutionary forces, we can impose an obligation on ourselves to work to solve our problems and keep going, not only for the sake of our individual and collective enjoyment, but also because our extinction would remove capacities which are perhaps so improbable that they have never fully evolved before and might never again.

If that argument seems a rather long way around to a banal political conclusion– do not allow inhuman, existentially unjust social situations to fester– consider it a means of expanding the circle of our care and concern beyond the little patch of earth each individual occupies from moment to moment. It is true that just as no individual is born deserving to suffer, so too no individual is born owing already existing people anything. Human beings are not born guilty in any sense. Neither the brutally oppressed nor the privileged chose the life they are born into. Everyone comes into the world with the same legitimate claim on sufficient resources for the purposes of living meaningful, valuable and valued lives. Each is also a being with the potential to develop into a social-self-conscious intelligence that can encompass the whole expanse of time and space in mind: to both feel and know themselves part of a greater reality; not a heaven beyond, but the real, physical heavens above. One can realize that and say: “great, now pass my beer.” Or one can realize that they just as well could have been born in a rubbish heap, hunted and despised, and conclude: there is nothing special about me other than the undeserved luck to be born in a safe environment, with people who did enough to care for me and a society that educated me to the point where I can comprehend my living connections to everything else.

From that recognition it does not follow that the fortunate individual owes every other individual a personal debt. What does follow, I suggest, is a general obligation to try to understand why the world is as it is and contribute to the progressive solution of the causes of existential injustice. The undeserved benefits of birth here rather than there should not rob anyone of the capacity to enjoy life. First, wallowing in guilt but otherwise doing nothing does not solve the problems, but even more deeply, everyone has just this one life to live. There is nothing wrong with enjoying the life that you did not choose to begin. At the same time, we are all in the world together, with senses and minds that bring us into contact with the circumstances of others’ lives. We cannot, reasonably, turn totally away from reality, but we are also not individually responsible for how reality came to be the way it is or for changing it. I do not think that Simone Weil, who starved herself to death because she could not bear the thought eating while others went hungry is an example of saintliness. However much one can learn from her otherwise, self-mortification to the point of death is not existential justice but moralistic irrationality.

Yet if we are born blameless we are not born without implicit responsibilities. As we develop we incur debts to those whose labour sustained us and the the natural world which supports all life. We cannot eat and claim that others are not harmed by starvation. We cannot enjoy the protections of law and deny that others equally need its protection. When we see situations which manifestly deny other’s access to what they need as social-self-conscious intelligences, our own intelligence must rebel. As Gandhi once wrote to Rabindranath Tagore “When war comes the poet must put down his lyre.” In other words, we have responsibilities to our time. No one is obligated to sacrifice every moment of their lives for the sake of others, but no one is free to completely ignore the realities of the world either. Existential injustice sensitizes us to the implications of the circumstances of birth. We do not choose to be born or where we are born, so the initial circumstances of life are not deserved. But as we mature we become aware of our surroundings, first in our immediate environment, and then outward in expanding circles. We cannot not be aware of our world (whether narrowly or broadly construed), but we can choose and work to ignore information.

No one is guilty for being born, but we are responsible, and therefore are guilty, for the choices we make to ignore the reality of existential injustice. We are parts of a world, not monadic worlds unto ourselves. We can wall ourselves off and be happy– ignorance is bliss- but no one is ignorant naturally, one must make themselves so. As the great neo-Confucian philosopher Wang Yang Ming wrote, if we open ourselves to it, we can recognize the humanity (jen) that connects all people (and all people to all animals and inanimate things). This recognition requires no special intelligence. “Even the mind of the small (uneducated) man is no different,” he says, “he himself makes it small.” Making our minds small, cultivated ignorance about what other people must somehow live through does, is culpable. When the war is over the poet can return to their beautiful harmonies, Gandhi adds, but when others are fighting one must join the cause.

But the problems of the world are vast and the powers of individuals small. But individuals do not live in the ‘world,’ they live in concrete times and places. We are not responsible for each other in the moralistic abstract. We are responsible for recognizing our shared humanity and acting in accordance with capacity. Those of us who live in democracies act responsibly by electing politicians who refuse to fan the flames of war, life-destructive violence, and environmental degradation. Those of us who think for a living must work to find the connections between whatever it is that interests us and the existence of the wider world that enables us to be active philosophically or scientifically. Everyone who becomes aware of what actually goes on in the world can at the very least state clearly what goes on, whether or not they have a full grasp of the causes and even if they do not (and no one does) have an immediately workable solution. And what goes on in the world is that some infants are in reality and through no fault of their own born on rubbish heaps, starved, and bombed, and killed.

The Examined Life

A: What it is Like to be a Philosopher

Driving down 2nd Concession, Amherstburg,

Snow-dusted fields.

and whispy clouds

frame silos,

tractors and trucks,

and fading red barns.

August’s 12 foot corn stocks

have been cut down to stubble

that will not grow again

’till May.

If I could I would

drive down long County roads

looking for places to bring my telescope

when January night falls early,

or walk along the river,

or follow the plot of a novel,

or watch a movie,

or read the paper,

or listen to someone speak,

or see kids playing,

or buy a shirt,

or have a tea,

or look at a painting,

without my mind’s gravity

pulling in questions

about why people do as they do

and did as they did

and will be as they will be,

and what does this mean,

and what that;

could things be otherwise than they are

and if so, why, and if not,

why not

and how do I make my case

and unmake yours

one way or the other?

I have made my point enough

for one life.

But thoughts come when they want to come.

Driving down 2nd Concession, Amherstburg I think:

“Who conceded what to whom?”

Were all parties satisfied,

or were there recalcitrants

who– faces reddening and fists pounding–

shouted:

‘If we concede so much at the 2nd

how much more will be taken at the 3rd, 4th and 5th?!”‘

The door once opened, more thoughts rush in:

“”Concession” can’t mean ‘concession.’

Somewhere in a dusty

County museum

that not even school kids get dragged to anymore

there must be an archivist,

in a grey sweater, Andy Capp cap,

and maybe a pipe

who knows the difference between

a Side Road and a Concession,

who it was that numbered the drain ditches

and the names of the parties to the dispute over Disputed Road.”

But I won’t stop and ask him today.

If I must be cursed by Socrates’ daemon

to think before I feel

I can at least amuse myself with equivocation

and keep some questions open

for my own delectation.

B: Mill and Pigs

It takes energy

to refract every light wave of an idea

and subject it to the test

of evidence or reason,

coherence or correspondence,

and to ask how context

shapes the seeing and the seen

and to worry about how charitable I should be

when something stupid comes my way.

If I could I would

just let the ideas play in mind

and not worry which one wants to be a paper

and which one a book.

Every particle of the world

does not need to be doubled

in writing.

I am getting tired;

all I want to do is drive

down lonely roads

and look at Andromeda,

2 million light years away

not looking back.

I want to walk in the silence

of flat straight space,

breath in the lilacs of spring,

watch the ships in the river,

take a drink on the patio,

and close my eyes at night

without pondering, posing,

or wondering how to prove.

It takes energy to refract every light wave

of an idea;

I am tired;

I don’t want to argue any more.

Mill said: it is better to be Socrates unsatisfied

than to be a pig satisfied.

But did he ask the pig?

Maybe it has been this search for something

Higher

something absolutely True

that we believe in but pigs don’t

that has been the problem all along.

Socrates,

our patron saint,

taught tyrants

who knew what they knew

and were not afraid

to prove it,

not with elenchus and syllogism

but exile and death.

The truck and the abbatoir await us all:

Mill and pigs

Socrates and Critias

me and you.

(But who is “I”

and who “you”

not to mention

“We” and “they).”

There really is only this moment,

or rather, not:

when you think about it,

it has already slipped away

and gone forever.

But no worries:

there is another,

and another

and another

until there is not.

To be and let be,

that is the answer.

To be neither selfless nor selfish

but a self

appropriating the wealth

of the magnificent surfaces of the world

without removing them from the commons.

_____________

“Thoughts come when they want to come” is borrowed from Nietzsche, somewhere in Beyond Good and Evil.

“Better to be Socrates unsatisfied …” is asserted by J.S. Mill in Utilitarianism.

“Socrates taught tyrants…” alludes to Critias, one of the leaders of the Thirty Tyrants who overthrew the Athenian democracy after Athen’s defeat by Sparta in 405 BCE. He had been a student of Socrates.

The University is Dying, Again

The dawn of the new year always generates ambivalent emotions. People resolve to overcome all the bad habits that gave some pleasure to their lives, media outlets compile their best of everything lists, while professional doomsayers sing their yearly Jeremiads, warning that the next year will be the year when everything that has been falling apart for the past year, and the year before that, and the year before that, finally collapses. The climate, the return of Trump, runaway malevolent AI, another pandemic, nuclear conflict with Russia … we are all going to die!

But maybe we will struggle through another year, despite Trump and natural gas stoves. And if we are still breathing come January 2nd, we will have to soldier on, facing the mundane problems we have always faced about how to run major social institutions, how to communicate with each other, how to evaluate where we are as societies, how to identify and solve problems. For most of human history these tasks were reserved for social elites, typically men with some sort of aristocratic pedigree which they took to be a sign of superior talent and capacity which entitled them to decide on behalf of everyone else how society would be governed. These elites were capable of works of epochal intelligence (as in ancient Greece, whose language gives us the English world aristocracy– rule of the best). But the free time required to walk, reflect, and compose the words that still resound today was– as Aristotle admitted– purchased at the cost of the freedom of women and slaves who did the work so that the “great souled” people could spread their genius.

We easily forget that the canonical Greek philosophers, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, were critics of Athenian democracy and defenders of slavery. Plato’s Republic is an extended reflection on how the principle of democratic equality corrupts the polis. In a democracy, he argues in Book Nine, the slave is as valuable as the master, the son as valuable as the father, and everyone’s position on matters that concern them is considered in the deliberative assembly even if they lack the expertise that wise decisions require. Therefore, he concludes, democratic equality is a contradictory equality between unequals, doomed to collapse. Democracy, he concludes, is a violation of the social conditions of intellectual excellence, a dangerous consorting with the lowest of human desires, and a fatal step towards disorder that can only end in tyranny.

There are shades of this aristocratic critique of democracy in the left-liberal reaction to the re-election of Trump. While they do not always say so out loud, there is an undertone of disdain for working class Trump voters: maybe they just aren’t smart enough to understand their own interests. After all, the core of Trump’s base are men without university degrees. If people were better educated, then perhaps they would stop entrusting their interests to autocrats like Trump and Putin. Had they read The Republic they would know that tyrants are elected because they promise to protect the interests of the poor.

In contemporary politics as in Newtonian mechanics, for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction. The left-liberal critique of the masses produces an abstract democratic-populist defense of the masses. It is difficult to assign any precise ideological identity to those who disagree with Trump but would defend the right of working class people to vote for him, but one common thread that links what I might call left-conservative populists with right-conservative populists is a gnawing angst about the state of popular culture and the educational institutions that produce the people who shape it. (i am not sure this term is correct, but it is at least not oxymoronic. Andrew Collier has written an excellent essay on the philosophical overlap between Marx and classical conservatism). Rather like Plato and his aristocratic friends, left and right populists worry that there is a destructive slackening of standards and values and that the educational system, and in particular, universities, share a great deal of the blame.

One could understand such a criticism coming from classical conservatives, for whom the democratization of higher education after World War Two was synonymous with slackening of standards. “Undergraduates without Latin and Greek!! Preposterous! What’s next, eating fruit with one’s hands at High Table!?!” But how can populists, who, after all, claim to be on the side of the people, worry that the consequences of the democratization of higher education are in effect destroying it? The question is not easy to answer. I want to look at two recent examples of what I am calling, for lack of a better word at the moment a left-conservative populist critique of higher education to tease out what is true in their arguments from what is a false romanticization of a past that never existed.

Joanna Williams (“The Death Throes of the University are Upon Us”) and Joel Kotkin, (“The American University is Rotting From Within”), both writing in spiked-online, warn that the cultural politics of the twenty-first century campus are destroying the intellectual integrity of the institution. They are not wrong to warn that universitiess in the United States, the United Kingdom (and Canada) are in a period of serious crisis. Kotkin notes that undergraduate enrollment in the United States has declined from 18.1 million in 2010 to 15.4 million in 2021. The decline is even steeper in the arts and humanities. In England, Williams adds, amidst the general decline in enrollment symbolically important programs like Philosophy at the University of Kent and English at the University of Canterbury have closed. In Canada and especially Ontario, universities, in particular smaller and comprehensive schools, are facing dramatic budget crises as a result of decades of government underfunding and a sharp decline in international student enrollments as a result of recent changes to federal immigration policies. My home institution, the University of Windsor, is facing a deficit of perhaps as much as 30 million dollars, which is about ten percent of its annual revenues. The Vice President of Finance has warned that the deficit could require “catastrophic” cuts.

(At present the administration has not presented a comprehensive plan to address the crisis. When they do, I will return to the political economic dimensions of the crisis of universities. Here I want to focus on the pedagogical and political thrust of Kotkin’s and Williams’ critique).

That thrust is nicely summed up by the subheading of Kotkin’s essay: “The modern academy is a threat to reason, liberty, and Western civilization.” What follows is mixture of anecdote and statistics that purports to prove that there has been a fundamental transformation in the nature of academic reason. Whereas universities were once focused on the dispassionate pursuit of objective truth that mission has been overtaken by a Cultural Revolution-like indoctrination campaign led by tender-hearted, weak-kneed, and soft-minded left liberals. Williams paints an analogous picture of the English university.

The targets will be familiar to those who follow the institutional politics of the contemporary English language university. There are purportedly absurd infiltrations of a “social justice” agenda into science, such as the engineering assignment that Williams discusses that asked students at King’s College to create ‘a product for LGBTQ+ people focused on providing education or safe spaces.” There are complaints about the decline of literacy, the capacity of students to read complete texts, lamentations about the proliferation of trigger warnings on classic literary and philosophical texts, politically correct changes to departmental nomenclature, and a climate of general hostility to the achievements of Western civilization adapted from anti-imperialist critiques of colonialism and racism. Kotkin sums up the problems:

“Ideologically homogenous universities have become something akin to indoctrination camps, where traditional Western values are trashed while woke ideology is promoted. Not surprisingly, the graduates of today’s universities are inclined to maintain rigid positions on various issues, confident of their own superior intelligence and perspicuity while being intolerant of other views. They also tend to be not particularly proud to be American. The kind of support professors gave to the war effort in the Second World War would be hard to imagine today.”

There is much truth is Williams’ and Kotkin’s arguments. Trigger warnings are childish and anti-intellectual; there have been dozens if not hundreds of cases of academics fired for violating institutionally imposed ideological lines; scientific method is often caricatured and misunderstood as an ideological construct of ‘the West,’ “inclusion” is often promoted at the expense of intellectually essential confrontation, contestation, and rational debate, and the research and teaching mission of universities too often clouded by platitudinous and practically useless commitments to extraneous political goals like “decolonization.” Williams is correct: academics who value their vocation as teachers and researchers must oppose these tendencies to the extent that they interfere with the teaching and research mission of the university.

However, both Williams and Kotkin are both guilty of romanticizing the history of the university and confusing demographic uniformity of the student body and professoriate with “reason, liberty, and Western Civilization.” The historical fact of the matter is that the nineteenth century model of the university which still forms the basic structure of the contemporary university was populated exclusively by white middle and upper class men who had time to devote to their studies because they did not have to work to pay tuition. The university system expanded rapidly in the nineteen sixties to absorb the Baby Boom generation, allowing working class students to access higher education for the first time, but also women, Blacks, and other minority groups. The transformation of curricula still ongoing today and often denounced as intellectually weak and anti-Western, the introduction of various forms of critical theory that questioned the philosophical, literary, and artistic canon and exposed links between political, economic, and cultural power and science, objectivity, and truth, was largely the result of struggle against a suffocating normality which young people in revolt against their parents’ world refused to accept without question any longer.

One generation’s revolution is the next generation’s normality and the new generation’s object of struggle. The ‘critique of Western civilization” that Kotkin decries is largely a function of the fact that Western societies and student bodies have become even more multicultural at the same time as voices from the Global South and Indigenous peoples refuse to be spoken for any longer and rightly insist on speaking in their own voices against the worst of Western civilization: imperialism, colonialism, racism. While the nations of the Global South have achieved political independence, the forces that oppressed them politically continue to operate on the socio-economic level. All one needs to do is to examine the flows of wealth from Global South to North and consider the degree of material inequality to understand that the history of imperialism and colonialism continues to damage the lives of people in the Global South. If the worst of Western civilization is that legacy of racism, its best aspect is its capacity for self-criticism that underlies both scientific method and philosophical questioning. Indeed, systematic criticism of “Western civilization” was the hallmark of The Enlightenment: read Condorcet, or L’Abee Raynal, or Diderot if you want to find impassioned denunciations of what passed for civilization at the time. Far from a dispassionate and neutral exercise of reason in pursuit of objective truth, the best scientists and philosophers at the time consciously deployed science and reason against established structures of rule and assumptions about what is true, valuable, and just. Today’s critics of Western civilization carry on that legacy (even if they often misunderstand ‘Enlightenment reason’ as part of the problem).

Kotkin and Williams might agree, but would perhaps rejoin that social criticism is not the problem but the illiberal and anti-intellectual effort to mold the university exclusively in their own ideological image. These efforts extend to efforts to get institutions themselves to take positions on key political struggles like the Israel-Gaza war. These are both real problems: the university, as the name implies, is an institution devoted to the free production, dissemination, and critique of knowledge. Academic freedom is an institutional right whose purpose is to ensure that these defining missions can be pursued. It cannot be qualified by any institutionally-imposed political postures. Moreover, the mission also cannot be qualified by groups outside of the university, whether corporate donors or politically mobilized groups trying to impose their agenda on teaching and research. The academic mission of universities is negated to the precise extent that the principle of freedom of inquiry, teaching, and mutual criticism is subordinated to money or particular political-cultural agendas.

At the same time, just because it is a space for free inquiry, teaching, and argument, the university campus is a politicized space. The wave of encampments that swept North American and UK campuses this summer were fully in keeping with the best traditions of the critical exercise of reason. What side do you think Voltaire or Diderot would have been on were they alive to witness the systematic destruction of cities that were home to 2.3 million people? Are babies being left to freeze, women and children forced to beg for food, and men stripped to their underwear and paraded around being treated with the dignity that Kant argued was the due of every human being? The fact that some protesters made some stupid comments in support of Hamas does not negate the right to protest the Israeli response. What is Israel’s reflex attack on any critic as anti-Semitic but an attempt to short-circuit debate of its history and policies?

As for the much maligned Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion agenda, one must not forget that its original incarnation as “Affirmative Action” was necessary to open the academy to women and Blacks. It too was attacked as a dangerous weakening of standards, when in fact it was an expansion of perspectives beyond the white middle and upper class men who completely dominated all academic fields prior to the 1960’s. The broadening of voices engaged in teaching and research inevitably broadened the range of subjects and methodologies taught and utilized, but that broadening was– and should still be understood as– rooted in the university’s mission to encompass the evolving whole– the universe– of human intellectual work. The universe of human knowledge encompasses both empirical methods that must be judged on the basis of their results and critical methods which expose the historical and social forces that always act shape knowledge production. That social and political forces shape knowledge production does not mean that knowledge and truth are nothing but social constructions. The atomic weight of nitrogen is the same in Beijing as it is in Cambridge, Massachusetts. But who gets access to scientific education, who gets positions at the most prestigious universities, which research programs are regarded as credible and which regarded as pseudo-science, have all been affected by non-scientific forces and assumptions. The belief that there was a a time when science was a pure pursuit of objective truth now compromised by ideological agendas is simply untrue. Consider only the history of military funding of scientific research at the best American universities. Is the US military not motivated by ideological concerns? Truth is not reducible to a social construction, but the institutions that pursue the truth are always structured by social forces that are motivated by social, political, economic, and ideological motives that determine what is regarded as legitimate and illegitimate scientific work. When critical methodologies help us understand those forces they actually make scientific work more scientific. Ideological influences compromise scientific objectivity, but if they remain undiagnosed their distorting influence cannot be corrected.

That is not to say that the DEI agenda cannot become a threat to academic freedom. David Robinson, Executive Director of the Canadian Association of University Teachers argued in a recent edition of the CAUT Bulletin that there is a difference between academics committing themselves to curriculum development and institutions mandating commitment to administrative DEI programs as a condition of hiring and promotion. (David Robinson, “EDI Statements: A Threat to Academic Freedom?” CAUT Bulletin, Vol. 70, No. 6, September-October, 2023, p.7) When DEI becomes an imposed public confession of faith it is indeed a threat to the mission of the university as an institution of free, open inquiry and argument. And it is not only administrations that are to blame here. Kotkin and Williams are right to focus attention on students and (mostly younger) academics for mobilizing against perspectives and people with whom they disagree. There have been too many instances of talks being cancelled, colleagues being publicly shamed, mobbed, and fired, for articulating positions that run afoul of left-liberal orthodoxy. George Elliot Clarke, Professor of English at the University of Toronto and past poet laureate of the City of Toronto sums up the problem: “It is cowardice and hypocrisy to pretend that the only threat to ourselves arises from Neanderthal administrators or authoritarian (foreign) governments or states, We also need to reject forthrightly censorship calls from both leftist and rightist, self-righteous “activists” as well as from their often nicely tenured allies who will okay bullying tactics so long as the Putsches are conducted against persons whose ideas they dispute.” (George Elliot Clarke, “Letter to the Editor, CAUT Bulletin, Vol. 70, No. 6, September-October 2023, p. 18). Such efforts are a direct threat to the university as a space for open inquiry and argument. Those who insist on the need for ideological conformity are free to resign their academic position and start a revolutionary party. Otherwise, tolerance and the unforced force of the better argument (Habermas) must prevail on campus.

But that principle cuts both ways. Curriculum reform, questioning and opening the canon, exposing the ideological and social forces that shape the disciplines, exposing the role of economic and political power in the determination of what counts as legitimate knowledge production, and allowing free play and learning to listen to formerly silenced voices is actually the best of what the university is. What have the best artists, philosophers, and scientists done over history other than break free of imposed orthodoxies that had become barriers to the growth of knowledge and the creation of beauty? That is what Copernicus, Bacon, Descartes, and Galileo did with regard to Aristotelian physics, that is what Einstein did with regard to Newtonian mechanics, and it is what critical race theorists and feminists and Marxists and anti-colonial scholars are doing today when they deploy their analyses to promote the growth of knowledge rather than obfuscate material reality.

Is the human intellect constricted or expanded when it listens to the voices of the colonized speak about their experiences? Is out literary sensibility constricted or expanded when we read literature in English written by authors from outside England? There is too much of the middle-aged scold in arguments like Kotkin’s and Williams.’ One fears that they would have been on the side of the salon directors who refused to show Impressionist works, or amongst the stampede of outraged concert goers fleeing Stravinski’s Sacre de Printemps, or nodding in agreement with Einstein’s rejection of quantum mechanics. But God does play dice with the universe, paintings do not have to be constructed on the basis of Renaissance theories of perspective, poems do not have to rhyme, and philosophy can criticize traditional standards of objectivity and truth. Science does not thereby cease to be science, painting and poetry art, or philosophy critical engagement with knowledge claims in the service of the goal of understanding our world in all of its aspects as broadly and deeply as we are capable of understanding it.

Beyond Friend and Enemy: Arguing From and To Shared Humanity

The seemingly unstoppable Israeli ultra-violence in Gaza and now Lebanon is a paradigmatic example of what happens when structural social and political problems become personalized. When people think about social structures as the source of problems they can reason constructively about how to fix them. However, when they think of distinct groups of people as the problem, the passion to destroy the enemy is aroused. The decision-maker cannot rise above their enmity and lashes out, ensuring that the history of trying and failing to solve a social and political problem by eradicating the enemy will be repeated. Failure and mass life-destruction are guaranteed in equal measure.

The locked-in pattern of kill and response currently plaguing the Middle East is another sad case in point. Presenting its operations as a response to evil, the current Israeli leadership cannot see what is obvious to almost everyone else: that it does in spades what it accuses Hamas and Hezbollah of doing– indiscriminately killing innocent civilians. The 8 year old daughter of the Hezbollah member killed in the exploding pager attacks is hardly responsible for her father’s political convictions. But instead of rising above the provocations and appealing directly to those Israeli’s in the street demanding a ceasefire, Hamas and Hezbollah militants respond in kind, giving Israeli fundamentalists exactly the rhetorical ammunition they need to work around growing global condemnation of their way of conducting the war and to continue it with even greater destructive force.

There are of course deep historical causes to this conflict, but there is also a subjective dimension which must be exposed and understood. Self-righteousness in a political cause fuels the cycle of life-destruction. As soon as any group or movement convinces itself that it is at war with an irrational, evil enemy, it becomes capable of the most outrageous atrocities. It cannot understand its actions as atrocities because it does not see suffering human beings on the other side but only an enemy, a thing to be exterminated. Once that ethical blindness to the underlying humanity of the people constructed as the enemy takes hold, rational argument cannot get leaders to change course.

That political struggles always involve two sides and that both sides construct a narrative to justify their actions does not mean, as Nietzsche argued, that there is no right and wrong but only clashes of perspective and afterwards the winner defines the truth. There are structures of power and those that benefit from them and those that suffer. Struggles are justified when ruling structures deprive groups of what they manifestly need as human beings: basic life-security and life-resources as well as control over social institutions where history has shown separate institutions to be necessary for basic life-security and access to life-resources. Perhaps we will evolve beyond nation states and distinct societies towards a new cosmopolitan system of political and social organization in the future. Right now, oppressed people and nations require control over their own state in order to protect themselves from the predations of the more powerful states in which they are forced to exist without rights, protection of the law, and, perhaps most importantly, respect as fellow human beings.

Struggling for the basic conditions of survival is to struggle for the most universal of human needs. Any group who enforces a system that structurally deprives other human beings of what they manifestly need because they belong to some demonized identity-group knowingly harms those victims. One can say, with justice, that they behave in an inhuman way. No one is obliged to suffer inhuman treatment meekly and without response. The hard part is to struggle against the inhuman structures and the groups who impose and maintain them without dehumanizing the opponent and conceiving liberation in terms of their liquidation and destruction.

I have been thinking about the ethical foundations of creative and transformative political struggle while working on a new book about the moral economy of peace. I was motivated to undertake the new work first by the political irrationality of the Russia-Ukraine war and convinced to continue by the on-going horror show provoked by the October 7th attacks. As part of this research I have recently been reading the work of B.S. Chimni, a Marxist critic of international law but also a sensitive thinker influenced by Gandhi’s philosophy of militant non-violence. Unlike most Marxists, Chimni is interested in the impact that different subjective ethical dispositions have on the effectiveness of struggles for fundamental social change. Reflecting on how he was led through Marx to Gandhi, Chimni wrote that he “wished to understand the meaning and salience of the relationship between self and social transformation. I was seeking a response to the question whether we can bring about human emancipation and protect nature by altering material structures alone or whether it requires an evolved ethical and spiritual self.” (“The Self, Modern Civilization, and International Law,” 1160) His reflections have convinced him that Gandhi’s general political-ethical argument was correct: history teaches that violence can change systems but not create the conditions for all-round human security, need-satisfaction, capacity realization, and life-enjoyment. Leaders who take it as their primary object to destroy the enemy rather than create the conditions for peaceful co-existence and mutually affirmative, egalitarian , creative interaction and relationships. New leaders might succeed in installing themselves in power, but will then prove incapable of ruling in the universal life-interest. History under such leaderships and movements thus ends up being an exchange of one tyranny for another.

Where we find progress in history it is not a function of the violent overthrow of dehumanized enemies but overcoming the structural constraints that existing institutions impose on the need-satisfying and life-serving use of resources. Progress has indeed required political struggle, but those struggles are progressive not because they kill a hated enemy but because they free resources for the sake of more comprehensive need-satisfaction, self-creation, and life-enjoyment. At the level of human interests, genuinely progressive struggles free the people who are the object of struggle too from their own prisons of ethical narrowness, one-sidedness, and hatred. It is easy to forget that Marx too taught that members of the ruling class were functions of the structures and dynamics of capitalism and that they too were alienated from what is most human in themselves. It is also true that he argued that the ruling classes were happy in their alienation, but that happiness is a delusion if it must be purchased at the cost of other people’s lives when an alternative that satisfies everyone’s shared life-interest is available. Socialism was not about liquidating the class enemy or smashing the state– cliches that resound most hollow when they are intoned by academics sitting safely in their campus offices far from the front lines. Socialism was about creating the conditions in which ‘the free development of each was the condition of the free development of all.” That goal cannot be achieved by people motivated primarily by hatred.

Politically, successful construction of a life-affirmative society requires patience. Patience is contrary to the passionate demand for justice. The sufferer wants an end to suffering right now; they want the complete restoration of what has been wrongly seized; they want, as Walter Benjamin insisted, vengeance for all their murdered ancestors. But the demands for absolute justice are contrary to the facts of human mortality and the pace of human historical progress. Horkheimer was correct to remind Benjamin that the dead are dead for ever; they cannot be brought back to life to enjoy the goods of which they were cruelly deprived. If hatred of what the enemy has done is used to fuel struggles oriented by the impossible goal of making good the sacrifice of earlier generations of victims they will succeed only in creating more victims on the other side. Instead they have to be directed against the system that crushed the dreams and extinguished the lives of past victims and proceed by the argument, expressed while looking the enemy squarely in the eyes, that it is never in the real interests of human beings to deprive other human beings of what they need and to protect that structure of oppressive deprivation by exterminatory violence.

The time is not always ripe for that sort of ethical-political argument. One can imagine the dead rejoicing at the final liberation of their community and one can hope that sheer force of will expressed as courage on the battlefield can accelerate historical change. Unfortunately, societies cannot be radically transformed until propitious objective conditions have emerged: the society cannot be ruled in the old way because its internal structures are collapsing, and the oppressed masses cannot tolerate being ruled in the old way. Hamas and Hezbollah have calculated that Israel is now in such a position. Hamas leader Yayah Sinwar claims that Hamas is prepared for a long war of attrition that will eventually break Israel’s will to fight. The evidence suggest, rather, that every militarized reaction from Hamas’s allies in the region increases Israel’s willingness to fight. Moreover, unlike America in Viet Nam and Afghanistan, Israelis are fighting on their home turf. No academic analogies about parallels between the settler colonialism societies built by Europeans in North and South America and Israel are going to change the facts of international law or the long view of Jewish history. Israel’s pre-1967 borders are legally legitimate and Jewish people have historical ties to those lands in ways that European settlers in the “new world” did not.

But the more important point is that everyone is where they are right now, and the task is not sending anyone elsewhere but addressing the legitimate historical grievances of the Palestinian people wrongly and violently dispossessed in 1948. The most powerful tool the Palestinians now have is the political force of world opinion which is turning more and more against Israel’s unjustifiable scorched earth policy in Gaza (and now Southern Lebanon), but the armed wing of the movement keeps giving Israel political room to breath by continuing an armed struggle that they are not in a position to win and exacts far greater costs from innocent Palestinian and Lebanese civilians than it imposes on Israelis. Both sides must somehow stop valorizing their struggle in terms of exacting a maximum price of pain from the enemy and instead find someway to begin reasoning with each other, starting from the premise that, since neither side is going anywhere, some sort of rapprochement is going to be necessary. If the problems can only be solved by negotiation and compromise, and every day that negotiations and compromise are delayed means more people who could have enjoyed a stable peace are killed and thus removed from the list of being capable of enjoying life, then reason dictates that negotiations should begin immediately. But the passions of enmity and mutual hatred fuel the self-righteousness that blocks recognition of the humanity of the other side. In the pressure of that boiling cauldron, abstract philosophical argument is insufficient to lower the temperature.

Still, philosophy is not useless. As Marx said, philosophy is of use where it becomes the servant of history. Here the history of the the supremely patient struggles of Canada’s First Nations might be instructive. They were betrayed by the Europeans they initially welcomed, their lands were stolen by violence and fraud, their cultures were marked for destruction, and yet they have endured. While they have used violence on occasion (the Northwest Rebellion), they have, for the most part, struggled politically and philosophically: they have argued, blockaded, maintained their traditions and languages against overwhelming odds; they have fought in court and in the media, and they have slowly begun to turn the tide. While in the abstract it might have been better for their societies had Europeans never arrived, they understand that the clock cannot be turned back. As Mohawk philosopher and activist Taiaiake Alfred has argued in this regard, there is little to be gained by personalizing historical problems. For that reason he says that he “is not a big fan of guilt as as a political tool. I think what guilt does is it paralyzes people, and it alienates people”(119, All About the Land). Instead, Alfred argues in favour of the descendants of the initial European colonial project to take collective responsibility for the historical fact that the wealth of the current country of Canada was generated through the violent expropriation of First Nations peoples. Collective responsibility has concrete implications: the treaties that were broken must be honoured and lands that were illegally seized must be returned. Treaties are “a fundamental agreement that is solemnized and recognizes the fundamental equality of the two parties.” Treaties create “commitment[s] on the part of the two parties to the agreement. It creates a commitment on the two parties to recognize both the independence of each other and the interdependency of each other on the land. That is what we mean by treaty in the Canadian context.”(118) Restoring Indigenous sovereignty over lands seized by violation of treaties that were purportedly negotiated in good faith does not mean that Canada as it currently exists must disappear; it means that it must be reinvented in a spirit of nation to nation equality and constructive creation for the sake of building a better confederation that is “good for everyone.”(169) Despite the violence Indigenous people have and continue to suffer, they have for the most part eschewed militarized forms of struggle, have survived, and are slowly winning the fight to restore their sovereignty over their traditional lands. One could always argue in the abstract that colonization should never have happened or that it should not have taken 500 years for wrongs to be righted. But history is indifferent to abstract argument. Colonization is a fact and the effects it had on Indigenous lifeways are not easy to undo. But I think that the changing relationship between Canada and the peoples of the First Nations is evidence that violence and mutual hatred can be overcome, if there are real efforts to overcome the structural problems imposed on the historically oppressed groups.

But in the Middle East any sort of constructive dialogue is lacking. Leaders on all sides will shout: the enemy is incapable of reason. To which one must respond: since no one is really talking (by which I mean, really listening) how does one know? Those same leaders will perhaps rejoin: talk is cheap, history proves that real change demands action. Indeed it does, but reason responds that negotiations are actions, concessions and compromises are actions, as are mass protests, strikes, blockades, and boycotts. The most momentous change of the last 50 years, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact happened almost without violence, because the objective conditions were such that the societies could not be maintained. No one who witnessed German youth smashing down the Berlin wall could believe that the Stasi were not gunning them down. And seeing that the Stasi were not gunning them down, those same youth did not pelt them with stones. Instead, East and West Berliners rushed towards each other and embraced and danced.

Well, they were all Germans, one could respond, and that obviously played a role. But it is even more true that we are all humans. When senses are attuned to reality we all know when other people are suffering: anguish sounds the same in every language because it is expressed in shrieks and sobs, not words. We all know when people have been unjustly deprived of what they need, and we all know, in general, what must be done to overcome that injustice. What we have not solved– but it is the most important thing– is how to make the changes that everyone, deep down, knows must be made, before tens or hundreds of thousands of people are killed by people trying to hold back the tides.

.

.

White Point

A paradox:

I float on the waves

that grind the mountains to stone,

the stone to sand,

the sand to sea.

Across the bay, the headlands

a dot-dash-dot

of rock-water-rock,

presence and absence.

Above, a Turner sky,

grey and silent and stern

hangs heavy

until the wind unravels its thickness

into tendrils and vaporous whisps.

The sun sets in clear skies.

Everything changes,

bit by bit,

stone to sand,

summer green to autumn red

to winter brown.

Harvest comes with a tinge of sadness

and the fly’s brief season

tempts your pity.

But the dying plant yields fruit

and the fly is born knowing its fate.

It buzzes happily

even as it feels the hint of frosts

in the night winds

that sing the close of its season.

There are no Platonic solids in nature;

beauty violates the Idea:

it is born malformed,

accidental,

material,

and oh so brief.

Eternity is no-thing

the Singularity

is not near,

or nearer,

but Now.

It is in the windblown shore grass,

the gull’s jarring screech and the plover’s skittish hop.

It is in the bright eyed kids’ first encounter with the surf

and their grandparent’s tired bones.

It is you and me and everything that lives,

ephemeral and never to come back.

There are no revenants,

no transcendence, no tunnels of light;

nothing is restored that has been lost.

Even the beat of the waves breaking on shore is not eternal.

Listen closer, it varies even now,

and by night will be as silent as the grave.

If I still had hair

it would have been bleached sun-kissed golden

by these sea-side walking meditations.

But everything changes

bit by bit,

one comes, another goes,

mountain, sand, stone and sea,

blossom, fruit, and desiccated stock,

birth and death,

everything changes,

bit by bit

and if I were more discerning

and honest

I would say what is easy to think:

there are no shoulds or oughts,

one comes, another goes,

flies and plants,

people and waves

stone and sea,

and that is how it is.

The Moral Irrationality of Fundamentalism

It is easy enough to dismiss the response of Hamas’s political leader, Ismail Haniyeh to Israel’s assassination of his three sons as the words of a deranged fanatic. Upon being informed that Israeli missiles had killed them, Haniyeh thanked God that they had been martyred. Whatever one might think about Haniyeh at a personal level, philosophy has to try to understand the logic at work in any expressed position and not indulge in dismissive ad hominem. Haniyeh’s response is important because it lays bear the moral structure of fundamentalist thinking. Note that I say “fundamentalist” and not “religious fundamentalist.” I leave out that qualifier deliberately because I want to focus on the genus and not the species. While Haniyeh’s brand of religious fundamentalism situates human history as a minor drama in an unfolding divine narrative, the secret to understanding fundamentalism and its moral irrationality is to tease out the way in which it absolutizes the purposes that orient it.

All political struggles are contests over the way in which institutions organize and govern human social life, determine resource distributions, set the relationship between public and private spheres, legitimize the division of labour, and set general boundaries to the formation and pursuit of individual goals. Fundamentalists, whether religious or secular, abstract the end– their preferred configuration of social institutions– from the well-being of people living here and now. Hence fundamentalism always coincides with maximalist and perfectionist programs that value the purity of the goal over the actual well-being of the people that the goal is supposed to serve. To paraphrase Jesus’ critique of the rabbis, the fundamentalist forgets that principles are made for human beings, not human beings for principles.

Because the principle is everything for the fundamentalist, the loss of life in pursuit of the complete realization of the principle is not only a necessary sacrifice, it is a supreme value. Haniyeh gives us a particularly vivid example of this form of thinking, but its is only an example, not an archetype. The real problem is the absolutism of the goal, its elevation above the maintenance and improvement of life–the only ultimately coherent goal of political struggle because life is the material condition of all enjoyment.

The question of whether social institutions are or good or bad can only be answered by examining the quality of life of the people whose lives are shaped by the norms the institutions impose. One cannot abstract the institutions from the practical matter of how people govern or are governed, work, relate, reproduce, and shape their individual life-horizons. The fundamentalist does just that: they abstract the goal– national independence, socialism, the glory of the motherland, whatever– from the lives of the people whose existence is a material presupposition of that goal’s goodness. Lying at the root of fundamentalist thought therefore is not god but the abstraction of regulating values as ends in themselves from the lives of human beings that give those values material substance and meaning.

Dying for the cause is never good for the person who dies, because they can never experience the better state of affairs for which they struggled. If individuals have only instrumental value as objects of sacrifice for the cause, then loss of life not only does not equal loss of value, loss of life would be gain of value as the number of martyrs soars. Haniyeh implies as much when he thanked God for the honour of having his children martyred. But Haniyeh forgets the most important question: what good does their martyrdom do them? Their life-value is reduced to a mere instrument of the lives of future people who will enjoy what they can no longer experience. “Their pure blood is for the liberation of Jerusalem and Al-Aqsa, and we will continue to march on our road, and will not hesitate and will not falter. With their blood, we bring about hope, a future and freedom for our people and our cause.” But dead people have no future on earth, which is the stage on which political struggles play out. If real value exists only in the other world– in eternal life with the Divine– then struggle for something as comparatively ephemeral as a nation-state is pointless. Political values can only be realized in secular time frames.

Religious fundamentalist thought is always incoherent as a basis for social criticism and justification for political struggle because it locates true value in the eternal. Secular fundamentalist thought is incoherent as a basis for social criticism and justification for political struggle because it demands the perfect realization of ideals. The absolutization of the value of either version’s principles reduces people to tools of the ideals. For the fundamentalist, therefore, not the heavens, but everyone alive may perish unless justice is done. But unwillingness to compromise, refusal to consider the interests of the other side, and insistence on a struggle to death in pursuit of a perfectionist version of a maximalist agenda ensures only on-going sacrifice of life, not the concrete improvements in its lived reality which alone explain the purposes of political struggle. Conflicts between two fundamentalist movements such as we see between Israelis and Palestinians today cannot be resolved: either side’s maximalist agenda could only be realized through the complete defeat or destruction of the other sides, but the numbers are too evenly matched to allow total victory.

Even if Hamas in its present form is thoroughly routed (which I still think is the most likely scenario, especially now that Iran has undermined the baby steps that Biden had been taking to reign in Israel’s onslaught in Gaza) new movements will arise until some form of Palestinian nation state has been created. But that will not be a single secular state encompassing all the lands of historical Palestine, because Jewish Israelis are not going anywhere, international law recognizes the legitimacy of the pre-1967 borders, there is no serious movement within Israel in support of a one-state solution, and there is no scenario concretely politically and militarily imaginable in which such a solution could be forced on them. The only way forward is some sort of compromise.

Compromise is anathema to fundamentalists, tantamount to failure, and thus never willingly entertained. Thus Iran, after committing what seems to me to be a colossal tactical and strategic mistake in attacking Israel in response to Israel’s strike on its generals in Syria, warns of an even more “devastating” response if– as is almost certain, given the adolescent posturing that passes for foreign policy today– Israel responds to the response. Immediately after the attack Ben Gvir was arguing that Israel should “go crazy” (exactly what it has been doing in Gaza). A strategically rational reaction would be to use the political capital Iran handed back to an Israel that was politically weakened on the international stage by doing nothing. But such is the nature of the “leaders” of existing nation states that the current Israeli government will most likely mindlessly enact the typical schoolboy script and feel the need to punch back.

On and on and on it goes, people dying, infrastructure destroyed, intellect wasted in the production of weapons systems, everyone chanting death until victory– but no one can win, because winning means concrete improvement in life conditions, a goal which can only be achieved when the value of political principles and goals is interpreted in concrete, life-valuable terms. A principled goal is good to the extent that its realization improves the lives of the people who will live under it, by: a) increasing access to the resources, relationships, and institutions that satisfy fundamental natural and social needs, and b) thereby allowing individuals and self-organizing collectivities to more widely and deeply develop, express, and enjoy their life-capacities for experience, imagination, scientific understanding, productive and creative work, mutualistic relationship, meaningful connection to the wider world, and all-round enjoyment of our finite time on the planet.

Since we are all crowded together but still divided into nation-states and would-be nation states, the realization of these generic goals requires mutual understanding and accommodation between peoples not just people. Real leadership understands the need for mutual accommodation and compromise, both for the sake of solving immediate conflicts and as a step towards a future world in which, perhaps, the narrow horizons of national identity are transcended.

But in order to take that step we must not abstract our principles from lived time. Our feet must be anchored on the ground where our lives play out, not in a fantasy of eternal life or the unsullied perfection of a mere idea. Religion is the heart of a heartless world, true, and principle can expose the contradictions of practice but value, as Nietzsche knew, must be lived here and now or not at all.

“It gives me a melancholy happiness to live in the midst of this confusion of streets, of necessities, of voices: how much enjoyment, impatiences, and desire, how much thirsty life and drunkenness of life here every moment. And yet it will soon be so still for all these shouting, lively, life-loving people … How strange that this sole thing that is certain and common to all, exercises almost no influence on men, and that they are furthest from regarding themselves as the brotherhood of death! It makes me happy to see that men do not want to think at all about the idea of death! I would fain do something to make the idea of life even a hundred times more worthy of their attention.” (The Thought of Death, Book Four, Aphorism 278, The Gay Science)

Rufo and “The New Right”

Chuffed by his role in forcing former Harvard president Claudine Gay to resign, Christopher Rufo has just penned a call to arms to “new right activists” to “win back the language, recapture institutions, and reorient the state toward rightful ends.” He does not tell us what “rightful ends” the state should serve or what those who disagree with them whatever they turn out to be should do. As a manifesto, it lacks the poetry of Marx and Engels. Its fussing over the capture of American institutions by the “far left” is derivative of the anxieties of late 60s and early 1970’s conservatives worried about the anti-war, anti-imperialist, and anti-capitalist youth. And its plea that the right emulate the political left’s strategy of capturing the leadership of major social institutions is ironic, given that many leftists (Srnicek and Williams, for example) have argued that leftists need to take a page from the way the right recovered from their defeats in the 1960 to dominate the 70s and 80s.

In short, the content and tone is predictable and superficial, but Rufo does raise important questions about the purpose of public institutions that are worth thinking through.

Rufo’s screed begins by telling his fellow travellers that both the old (nineteenth century) liberalism and conservatism are dead. Warming the right-wing heart with memories of Reagan will not work; the new right needs a new action plan for new times. He does not mention Trump and I do not know what his position is on MAGA Republicans (they certainly have organizing power, but Rufo is perhaps too much of an intellectual to go in for their manifold absurdities). Rufo focuses on stopping “establishment conservatives” from retreating any further from the core values of the “political tradition of the west– republican self-government, shared moral standards, and the pursuit of eudaimonia.”

I found the inclusion of eudaimonia next to ‘shared moral standards’ in a conservative argument odd. Without saying anything more about what ‘shared moral standards’ he has in mind (Judeo-Christian morality, I presume) the value of flourishing (eudaimonia) pulls in the direction of individual difference and self-creation, not shared substantive values. Aristotle could assume shared moral principles, but in a pluralist country like the United States, shared moral standards are the problem, not the solution. Individual flourishing presupposes access to resources and, therefore, (if you ask me) any society that prioritises flourishing must institutionalise the principle (common to socialism and egalitarian liberalism but foreign to the classical liberalism or libertarianism) that everyone should be able to access the basic resources, relationships, and institutions that the flourishing of their lives requires. But as for religious beliefs, cultural traditions, and the content of the lives people choose to pursue, those would necessarily differ. Without further unpacking his thought, Rufo leaves his position open to questions about its normative and political coherence.

However, as I noted, the essay is a short call to arms and not a political philosophy paper. “The Right doesn’t need a white paper,” he argues, it needs activists willing to go to battle– as he did in the Harvard plagiarism scandal– to take back institutions. Unless the right takes back control of schools and statehouses, all talk of ‘righteous ends’ is just academic hot air.

But a battle against what forces? Rufo provides further support for an argument that I have made for decades concerning the connection between postmodern critiques of objective truth and the right-wing. Rufo argues that “while postmodern theorists who reduced politics to “language games” may have overstated the case, … they were right in one respect: language is the operative element of human culture. To change the language means to change society: in law, arts, rhetoric, and common speech.” Rufo (and the postmodernists) are correct that language is the operative element of human society, but they are wrong to infer that political power is a function of control over language. Power does not stem from control over the OED or the barrel of a gun (Mao), but from control over the resources (natural, technological) upon which everyone’s lives and livelihood depends. Control over the language is often used in a purely ideological way make it seem as though substantive social changes have been made when in reality the class dimensions of political and economic power have not been changed at all.

Such is the case with the language of ‘Equity, Diversity, and Inclusion” that drives Rufo so crazy. Let us confine our attention to the universities for a moment. Rufo believes that the leadership of universities has been seized by a far left cabal bent on destroying academic standards and turning America’s halls of academia into madrassas of political correctness. I have worked in universities for thirty years and can assure everyone who is worried that they are not led by far left activists and that the biggest threat to academic freedom is the role of private money (as l’affaire Harvard also proved) and the ubiquitous demand made by public funders that university curricula serve the interests of business by producing “job ready” applicants that can be fed into the most dynamic sectors of the economy.

Anyone concerned with academic standards and freedom should be concerned when any extraneous political agenda is imposed upon academics and students, whichever side of the political aisle it claims to serve. Curricula needs to be determined by the state of the art in the field and not preachy administrators hoping to cure the ills of the world through changed reading lists. At the same time– as Rufo’s own arguments admit– the world has changed. The most important change– in the humanities at least– is the emergence of long silenced voices that demand– rightly– to be heard. The state of the art in the field should determine the curricula in all disciplines, but certainly in the humanities the state of the art means including the works of historically colonised people, critical race theorists, and others who have been demonstrably oppressed by the dominant structures of power and wealth. Including those voices does not mean that they should dominate the conversation to the exclusion of older perspectives, but it does mean that they have to be heard.

Rufo’s intervention does not go into details about how he would reform institutions in general or universities in particular, but the general arguments he does make contradict themselves. He calls out the left for its “euphemistic rule,” but then concludes that the new right must “replace contemporary ideological language with new, persuasive language that points towards clear principles.” Two points are in order: first, persuasive language need not be true, and second, clear principles can be ideological. Rufo intends his readers to conclude that his feet are planted in the soil of objective truth, but he himself admits that he is mobilizing power to prosecute a political– ideologically partisan– agenda.

Rufo’s penchant for making bald faced contradictions perhaps explains why works for a think tank and not an academic institution. If he worked as an academic, he would have to defend his arguments from critics who would expose his contradictions. As a private researcher, he is free to deal in platitudes about the superiority of passion to reason and re-setting the public agenda on the basis of “clear principles.” (He also does not have to fend off charges of plagiarism, which is good for him, because he flat out plagiarises Hume’s argument, from Essay on Human Nature, that reason is the slave of the passions. Maybe Claudine Gay should expose him).

In any case, the problem with Rufo’s criticisms of the “euphemistic left” is that he wants his readers to think that his “clear principles’ are objectively true, while at the same time arguing that all principles are political and that public life is really a Nietzschean battle to impose one’s own preferred ‘truths’ on everyone else. He writes that “no institution can be neutral– and any institutional authority aiming only for neutrality will immediately be captured by a faction more committed to imposing ideology.” If true, it follows that this argument applies to Rufo as well, and that, consequently, his real agenda is not to protect objective truth from the infamies of the ‘far left,’ but just to impose his ideology on everyone else.

But institutions can be neutral, in the partisan political sense, and yet passionately commit themselves to fulfilling their purpose. To speak again only of the universities, the belief that they must serve a cliched left or right wing agenda is simply false. Faculty and students have political positions, which they must be free to defend (not impose) in the context of academic argument, but the university itself, if it is to function as a space for open, free, intellectual inquiry, criticism, and debate, cannot serve any political master. There have been egregious cases of faculty being hounded out of their positions, not had their contracts renewed, or fired, for running afoul of EDI platitudes. I have criticized these violations of academic freedom and integrity and will continue to do so. But the solution is not a “new right” take over of the universities (as has happened at New College in Florida), but a recommitment of all members of the university institution to the discipline and courage of argument. The purpose of the university is not to spread any particular group’s “truth” but to expose every truth-claim to the test of open examination and criticism. The truth will out, but not because one group is more committed to its partisan principles than another. The truth is what survives contestation and criticism. If Rufo is serious about returning institutions to their purposes, he needs to stand on the side of critical engagement and not on the side of forcibly silencing opponents who annoy him.