The Examined Life

A: What it is Like to be a Philosopher

Driving down 2nd Concession, Amherstburg,

Snow-dusted fields.

and whispy clouds

frame silos,

tractors and trucks,

and fading red barns.

August’s 12 foot corn stocks

have been cut down to stubble

that will not grow again

’till May.

If I could I would

drive down long County roads

looking for places to bring my telescope

when January night falls early,

or walk along the river,

or follow the plot of a novel,

or watch a movie,

or read the paper,

or listen to someone speak,

or see kids playing,

or buy a shirt,

or have a tea,

or look at a painting,

without my mind’s gravity

pulling in questions

about why people do as they do

and did as they did

and will be as they will be,

and what does this mean,

and what that;

could things be otherwise than they are

and if so, why, and if not,

why not

and how do I make my case

and unmake yours

one way or the other?

I have made my point enough

for one life.

But thoughts come when they want to come.

Driving down 2nd Concession, Amherstburg I think:

“Who conceded what to whom?”

Were all parties satisfied,

or were there recalcitrants

who– faces reddening and fists pounding–

shouted:

‘If we concede so much at the 2nd

how much more will be taken at the 3rd, 4th and 5th?!”‘

The door once opened, more thoughts rush in:

“”Concession” can’t mean ‘concession.’

Somewhere in a dusty

County museum

that not even school kids get dragged to anymore

there must be an archivist,

in a grey sweater, Andy Capp cap,

and maybe a pipe

who knows the difference between

a Side Road and a Concession,

who it was that numbered the drain ditches

and the names of the parties to the dispute over Disputed Road.”

But I won’t stop and ask him today.

If I must be cursed by Socrates’ daemon

to think before I feel

I can at least amuse myself with equivocation

and keep some questions open

for my own delectation.

B: Mill and Pigs

It takes energy

to refract every light wave of an idea

and subject it to the test

of evidence or reason,

coherence or correspondence,

and to ask how context

shapes the seeing and the seen

and to worry about how charitable I should be

when something stupid comes my way.

If I could I would

just let the ideas play in mind

and not worry which one wants to be a paper

and which one a book.

Every particle of the world

does not need to be doubled

in writing.

I am getting tired;

all I want to do is drive

down lonely roads

and look at Andromeda,

2 million light years away

not looking back.

I want to walk in the silence

of flat straight space,

breath in the lilacs of spring,

watch the ships in the river,

take a drink on the patio,

and close my eyes at night

without pondering, posing,

or wondering how to prove.

It takes energy to refract every light wave

of an idea;

I am tired;

I don’t want to argue any more.

Mill said: it is better to be Socrates unsatisfied

than to be a pig satisfied.

But did he ask the pig?

Maybe it has been this search for something

Higher

something absolutely True

that we believe in but pigs don’t

that has been the problem all along.

Socrates,

our patron saint,

taught tyrants

who knew what they knew

and were not afraid

to prove it,

not with elenchus and syllogism

but exile and death.

The truck and the abbatoir await us all:

Mill and pigs

Socrates and Critias

me and you.

(But who is “I”

and who “you”

not to mention

“We” and “they).”

There really is only this moment,

or rather, not:

when you think about it,

it has already slipped away

and gone forever.

But no worries:

there is another,

and another

and another

until there is not.

To be and let be,

that is the answer.

To be neither selfless nor selfish

but a self

appropriating the wealth

of the magnificent surfaces of the world

without removing them from the commons.

_____________

“Thoughts come when they want to come” is borrowed from Nietzsche, somewhere in Beyond Good and Evil.

“Better to be Socrates unsatisfied …” is asserted by J.S. Mill in Utilitarianism.

“Socrates taught tyrants…” alludes to Critias, one of the leaders of the Thirty Tyrants who overthrew the Athenian democracy after Athen’s defeat by Sparta in 405 BCE. He had been a student of Socrates.

Dark Age/What Would Francis Fukuyama Say?

Where is Christopher Rufo now when the university needs saving, not from left-wing professors with zero real social power but overt assaults from the American State? Or is Donald Trump really invested in the academic integrity of American universities? That must be the explanation behind his 400 million dollar cut to Columbia University imposed because of its purported failure to combat “anti-semitism.” One might be forgiven for worrying that the demand that the Middle Eastern, South Asian, and African Studies Department be subjected to “academic receivership for a minimum of five years” is an overtly totalitarian attack on the independence of academic institutions from the state. But I guess I am one of those left-wing professors who control everything, so what do I know?

So in order to alleviate my ignorance I ask again: where are the right-wing zealots who decry attacks on free speech on campus? Free speech is the genus, academic freedom is the species: who amongst the conservative crowd that brays regularly about how DEI and wokeness are destroying independence of mind is going to step up and denounce the naked use of state power to suppress critical thought? Or is the use of state power only wrong when it affects one’s own side? In which case, there are no longer political principles but only raw power. If there is only raw power then there is no problem with the suffocation of dissent say, by arresting and imprisoning Mahmoud Khalil, one of the organizers of the pro-Palestinian encampment at Columbia. Rufo and his gang portray themselves as radicals bravely swimming against the stream, but their silence now shows them for what they really are: hypocritical worshippers at the altar of state power.

That is all we will hear from them: hypocritical cheerleading for the state whose power they supposedly want to keep out of the minds of people. The arrest of Khalil is alarming for a number of reasons– he did not engage in any criminal acts nor is he charged with any; he did not incite others to violence and he is not a member of any proscribed terrorist organization. What he did do was protest the overtly genocidal threats made by the Israeli government to kill or expel the entire population of Gaza, the actual killing of over 45 000 people, and the complete destruction of the infrastructure of life-support. In short, what he did was to use the First Amendment to the purposes for which it was written: to articulate political arguments, to voice objections, to lodge protest against grave injustice, to testify that war crimes and crimes against humanity had been committed, and to mobilise opposition to them by using his voice, not weapons. For these political acts he was arrested in front of his pregnant wife, threatened with the cancellation of his green card and deportation, and imprisoned.

Freedom of speech, just watch what you say, as Chuck D once rapped.

Time and again we are subjected to right-wing stunts like Qu’ran burning or wildly offensive jokes designed to enrage the wokies as object-lessons in the importance of free speech. Book burning in any form is anathema to free minds, and as for jokes, they need to be taken as jokes and laughed at or tolerated, as per one’s tastes. Chacun a son gout: if you don’t find them funny, don’t listen to the comic. Free speech gives people wide but not unlimited latitude to offend, but it is not fundamentally concerned with protecting a space for profane humour. Freedom of speech is not first and foremost an aesthetic principle, although it is that too (and sections of the left needs to heed the universal implications of the principle). Freedom of speech is first and foremost a political principle that protects public space for the free, i.e., not-state controlled- dissemination of political arguments, including arguments about the need to mobilise political movements, criticise existing governments and policies, and organize against them and in favour of alternative parties and priorities.

As Hannah Arendt might say, the right to free speech is an eminently political value. Politics is the use of the power of mind and argument to organise and direct collective energies towards the end of protecting and extending the space for democratic power. Where politics ends, coercion and violence begin. Lacking convincing arguments to refute the critique of Israeli tactics and strategy in the struggle against Palestinian self-determination, the Netanyahu government is on a global crusade to convince the governments of purported constitutional democracies to criminalise argument. They have found a willing executioner in the Trump administration.

Such attacks are not only attacks on a particular constitutional principle, they are direct attacks on democracy itself. Democracy is much more than parliamentary chatter. It involves at the deepest level collective control over the resources, goods, institutions, and relationships upon which need-satisfaction and the free-development of our affective, intellectual, creative, and relational capacities depend. As I have put the point in other works, genuine political democracy is possible only in democratic societies in which all major social institutions, including economic institutions, are collectively controlled and governed by majority decision following free deliberation amongst all parties affected by the decision. But parliamentary chatter– deliberation, in its highest form– is very much central to the practice of democracy. Consider any democratic institution, from the Athenian agora, to the Great Law of Peace, to early soviets, and even the American Senate– the world’s greatest deliberative body, purportedly– and you will find at its core open-ended talk. In principle, parties to political deliberations argue for as long as it takes to arrive at a mutually agreeable compromise. In practice material necessity imposes time limits. But time limits and decision by majority vote are distinct from ideological constraints on the content of allowable speech. Trump and his Heritage Foundation handlers are openly and explicitly threatening to destroy opponents rather than convince them through superior reasons. Trump goes so far as the argue that criticism of his policy in the media is illegal.

Funny conservative sense of heritage. Aren’t conservative the ones who regularly warn of liberal experiments with ‘social engineering?” If Khalil’s arguments are as egregiously bad as his captors think, or Trump’s policies so much better than his critics argue, they should be easy to refute in the one case and support in the other, no? And if America was once great, why was that? Slavery? Jim Crow? The Trail of Tears? No country worships its constitution like America. The hermeneutic effort expended, especially by conservatives, to discern the intentions of the “Founding Fathers” makes Talmudic scholars look lazy and superficial. Where is the Maimonides who can explain this to me, a perplexed philosopher who wants to know how respect for the Constitution, whose First Amendment reads: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances,” can be squared with the arrest– without criminal charge– of a protester exercising exactly the powers granted him by that amendment or to threaten the “free press” with criminal sanction for criticising the government of the day?

The student encampments were dramatic efforts to get the American government to listen to the voices of the dying people of Gaza. To claim that they are anti-Semitic is nonsense. Is opposition to Trump anti-Scottish American? Was opposition to Jim Crow anti-white? Here again we see the pernicious effects of the identity politics to which conservatives claim to be dead set opposed. The attack of the right to employ the freedom of speech to protect criticism of Israel or Trump is based upon the conflation of the state of Israel with Jewish identity and Trump’s policies with being American. If that is not identity politics, what is?

Of course, many, many stupid and naive things were said about “the resistance” and Hamas’s tactics in some of the demonstrations and encampments. Freedom of speech is the right to make good and bad arguments equally. The antidote to bad argument is better argument, not prison and deportation. Despite right-wing hyper-ventilation, the encampments were not violent: these were not Weather Underground fools who thought that burning ROTC buildings was going to hasten the anti-imperialist revolution. Keffiyehs are not Kalashnakovs. They were simply gatherings of engaged young people– many Jewish– exercising their right to freely express their opposition to the catastrophe unfolding before the eyes of the world. Again, some failed to properly understand Hamas’s cynical complicity in provoking the invasion, but youthful naivete is not criminal, and voicing abstract support for a liberation struggle is not equivalent to membership in a terrorist organization.

How quickly history unravels. In the 1990s Francis Fukuyama claimed that political history was over; liberal-democratic institutions represented the high point of the evolution of political rationality. They would inevitably sweep the world in the wake of the collapse of Stalinism. He appeared to be correct: the world was swept by liberal-democratic revolutions, but today those institutions have largely betrayed those who struggled for them. The betrayal was not caused by the ideas behind liberal democracy: rule of law, separation of powers, formal equality of all institutionalized in constitutional rights of citizenship, peaceful transfer of power. Those are all elements of any practically workable democratic society of any significant size. They are frames to be built upon, not rubbish to be cleared away. No, the ideas did not betray those who fought to build liberal-democratic societies, it was capitalism and the substantive powerlessness it imposes on the majority of people, a powerlessness manifest as monstrous and growing material inequality and the impotence of social democratic and liberal forces to protect people’s lives and livelihoods. That material damage has undermined the liberal-democratic state from within and created a legitimacy vacuum being filled in state after state by right-wing populist nationalists. Contrary to Hegel and Fukuyama, the Spirit does not move inexorably forward and the future, at least in the near term, looks a whole lot worse, politically, than the period that stirred Fukuyama’s hopes.

If A Hurricane Destroys South Florida and There is No One Left at the NOAA to Predict it, Did it Really Happen?

The Department of Government Efficiency, (DOGE) led by Elon the DOGE (Dangerous Oligarch Gutting Everything), is driven in part by the libertarian belief that there is no genuine public interest or public good, partly by capitalists’ interests in freeing business activity from any sort of oversight and regulation in the public interest, and partly by Trump and the MAGA movement’s antediluvian, anti-science worldview. Cuts to USAID that affect antiAIDS programs in South Africa, the threat to withdraw from the World Health Organization, forcing the CDC to cut back on global monitoring of disease threats, impeding the ability of American government scientists to freely communicate with other scientists around the world– arguably the most important intellectual condition for the advancement of human scientific knowledge– firing hundreds of climate scientists at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), forbidding the public use of references to ‘climate change” in official government documents, and putting kooks like Robert F. Kennedy Jr. and — even worse, former Professional Wrestling impressario Linda McMahon– in charge of the Departments of Health and Education respectively–can only be understood as attempts to construct a fantasy-reality in deep conflict with the material reality whose basic elements and forces and their connection to human life natural science studies. Since material reality never loses a conflict with human wishful thinking, I believe that the rest of the world should let the Trumpites try to return to the 18th century of mercantile economics, a world before the germ theory of disease, vaccinations, public health and education, knowledge of the mathematics of probability and the power of computer modelling. Let them have their red hats and delusions: we in the rest of the world should throw open our doors to American scientists and progressives and drain the MAGA swamp of people who do not want to be swamped by Category Five hurricanes or roasted in out of control wildfires.

I am not being facetious. Canada has to be proactive in transforming its economy in the face of American tariffs and one crucial place to start is with a massive investment in our universities. Canadian universities have been underfunded for decades (especially in Ontario). The unprecedented assault on scientific research currently underway in the United States is an opportunity to poach some of the best talent from American universities and create new synergies with on-going research in Canada. And not only in the natural sciences: technological development is going to cut into manufacturing employment over the medium to long term, Trump tariffs or not. The world is going to need artists and writers and commentators and critics and policy analysts: all contributions that the arts, social sciences, and humanities can make to the future. Culturally and geographically a move to Canada is far easier for American academics than a move to Europe. Crisis is a moment of opportunity: Canadian workers must absolutely be protected against job losses, but we also have to seize the moment and turn our economy in a different direction– not only away from integration with the American, but towards the future. A generational investment in our universities to attract top American talent is one key step in that direction.

There are precedents in our shared history for large scale movements of American’s north. Canada of course welcomed tens of thousands of American young people in the 60’s fleeing the risk of being sent to Viet Nam. Less well-known but perhaps more directly relevant to my proposal is the influx of American academics to fill positions as the higher education system here expanded rapidly in the 1960s to accommodate the Baby Boomers. Canadians are quick to point out to how so many of the world’s favourite American celebrities and singers are actually Canadian, but Americans who have moved here have enriched our cultural and intellectual life as well. Now is absolutely not the time to turn inward and wrap ourselves in Hudson’s Bay blankets of chauvinism; it is a time to both reach out and transform from within.

Investing in Universities alone is not going to solve the problem. Canadians are also going to have to contend with massive unemployment. If the tariffs persist, and the new tariffs promised and threatened on steel and aluminum and softwood lumber added, 1.5 million jobs could be lost, according to the Canadian Labour Congress. Trudeau and Ford and the other premiers might talk tough, but the economic facts of the matter suggest that Canada is not going to win an all out trade war with the United States. Retaliatory tariffs will bite in local regions of US economy, but overall the effect will be small, given that exports to Canada are a small fraction of overall US economy (about 1.3 % of GDP) whereas the value of Canadian exports to US (77 per cent of all Canadian exports) compromise around 25 % of Canadian GDP: an astounding level of vulnerability.

No Canadian government– no government, as a matter of fact– can simply accept an ally effectively ripping up a treaty (one demanded and signed by Donald Trump himself, in the case of the Canada-USA-Mexico trade agreement. I wonder if Trudeau pointed out to Trump that if the agreement is bad it is his fault, as it was negotiated under his watch)? That said, now is not the time for tough talk but creative transformation of the Canadian economy. Structural and qualitative transformations take time, but one short term policy that could be implemented right now is the long-debated but never implemented Guaranteed Basic Income (GBI). Versions of this policy have floated around for at least forty years but no government has implemented it in any systematic way. Now is the time! A GBI would allow for a planned reduction in average working hours per week which would, in turn, allow for the possibility of job sharing as a way of mitigating higher levels of unemployment and increasing the quality of life by making available more free time.

For example, a reduction of 25%, from a 40 to a 30 hour week, would allow more workers to be employed for less time while the GBI would make up for the wages lost in proportion to the reduced hours. If a firm employed 50 workers at 40 hrs/week that would amount to 2000 person hours of employment. If every worker worked only 30 hours a week the same firm could employ 66 workers for a total of 1980 person hours. The math is crude and the implementation would be more complicated, but the example, rough as it is, shows how jobs can be created by re-dividing labour time without expanding production.

Systematic investment in this sort of scheme could catalyze deeper social changes. The experienced value of more free time might break the cycle of addiction to ever higher levels of consumption of things whose rush wears off as soon as they have been taken out of the box. Breaking our understanding of what is enjoyable and worthwhile free from mindless concumerism would furthermore reduce the need for higher money wages (which are one dimension of inflationary spirals). Working less, demanding less, living and experiencing more we would all reduce our dependence, not just on American markets, but capitalism. In any case, something like this policy is going to be required; the Labour Congress warned that 1.5 million jobs could be lost because of the Trump tariffs, but another study warned that between 1.5 and 7.5 million Canadian jobs could be lost to automation.

We need to be clear that capitalism is the problem. Capitalism sets workers at odds with each other in a cut throat competition for scarce jobs. On one level it is lamentable to hear the United Auto Workers come out in support of Trump’s tariffs. On the other hand, what real choice do they have so long as workforces are divided along national lines while capital roams free? Free trade has damaged Canadian and American industrial bases, of that there can be no doubt. The primary functions of unions today is to protect their members’ jobs and secure job-creating investment. But the fact of the matter is that Mexican, American, Canadian, and, let’s be clear, Chinese workers all need their jobs. Remember what a worker is: someone who must sell their labour power to a capitalist because they have no other means of life. That shared material reality is the objective basis of shared interest across borders. But solidarity cannot be built overnight and the threat of mass job losses is real. While still working to build new bridges between workers across borders and against the capitalist class, immediate steps must be taken that both ward off disaster and slowly begin to transform capitalism from within in a democratic, life-valuable, cooperative and socialist direction.

______

And now, I need to take a break from Trump commentary. In an older post long ago I said that I am not a journalist and I do not want the blog to chase the news. I am worried that Trump is forcing me to break my vow. He has a unique ability to attract attention to himself. He is like a magpie, shrieking with excitement about every new shiny object he sees and making everyone around him stop and look. I need my attention span back. Henceforth, until he causes a genuine catastrophe or achieves something worth philosophical reflection, I will do my best to ignore him.

Stalin or the Wizard of Oz?

Whatever Trump ends up achieving (or more likely, not achieving) in his second term, he has made personality cults great again. Exhibit A: the shameless ass-kissing of acolytes whom he once viciously insulted– “Little” Marco Rubio comes to mind- gushing about how Trump is the only one who can reform government, cleanse America’s body of illegal immigrants and its soul of woke platitudes, bring about world peace, and restore American manufacturing dominance. But one month in, there have been no substantive achievements and his poll numbers are dropping: only 49 % of Americans approve of Trump’s performance. What will happen when his cuts start to hit home? Poor and white working class Americans can feel proud that Ivy League colleges which they will never attend can no long use race as a factor in admissions, but when their social security payments are chopped and Medicaid is reduced, they will not be able to blame Democrats or illegals. At that point– probably just as mid-term election season gets into high gear– Trump’s coalition may well start to unravel. Remember his signature promise from his first term: ending Obamacare. He did not end it because Congress realized that even his most rabid working class supporters in red states had learned that Obamacare, flawed as it may be, actually helped them meet their healthcare needs.

Trump would love an eighty foot bronze statue of himself on Wall Street, but through his first term and one month of his second he is more Wizard of Oz than Stalin: a sad old man madly pulling levers to sustain the illusion of fundamental change. But it is mostly theatre. Take for example his crackdown on illegal immigration. While the pace of deportations has increased, the raids seemed staged with future political commercial in mind that will remind voters that “Trump does what he says.” However, only one month in to the “biggest crackdown on illegal immigration ever” ICE officials are being re-assigned because of the slowing rate of removals. Slow or fast, there is no way that Trump will undermine the agricultural economy by targeting migrant labourers en masse. There are about 11 million undocumented migrants in America now, and in 2028 I predict there will be just about 11 million undocumented migrants in America.

His other signature piece– tariffs, have yet to be imposed, save on China, and then only at 10% rather than the 60% he promised. Inflation is creeping up and while that may not dissuade him from going forward with the broader suite of tariffs he has promised, the disruption to industrial supply chains that will cause will not leave American workers unscathed, at least in the short term. Auto executives have been sounding the alarm about the impact tariffs on Canadian and Mexican manufactured parts and American brands is evidence that the American ruling class remains split on Trump. Those splits are likely to get wider if Trump does proceed with his attempt to return to an essentially mercantilist global political economy with America at the centre. If enough workers start to hurt from disrupted supply chains, higher costs for consumer goods, prescription drugs, and the generalized chaos mass layoffs in the federal government are likely to cause, Trump’s Napoleonic period will be even briefer than the real one’s reign.

But the past week’s news cycle has been focused on Trump’s foreign policy, and here his goals, while contradictory, are not uniformly wrong. Trump is correct: the Ukraine war does need to end and it never should have started in the first place. He is also correct that it is not America’s job to protect the whole world– that argument has been a staple of Realist thinking since the end of the Cold war, not to mention a key plank of peace and anti-imperialist movements. His “plan” for Gaza, is abhorrent and needs no further critical comment, but the people of Gaza do need to live in peace and material security. The danger that Gazans face is less from his plan than from Israeli unwillingness to allow Gaza to be reconstructed. While still astoundingly callous and arrogant, he also sometimes says some surprising and welcome things: he has proposed nuclear talks with Russia and China to reduce stockpiles and there are reports that Secretary of Defense Hegseth has ordered a review of Pentagon spending that could lead to epochal reductions (32% over four years, if reports are true) in the military budget.

The Democrats pursued none of these laudable- in the abstract- foreign policy goals. At the same time, we are not witnessing a retreat of America from the global stage, but a re-configuration of the way in which American power is deployed. Despite liberal hand-wringing we are not seeing the decline of the ‘rules-based international order,” because there never was a “rules-based international order.” There was and is a power-based international order in which the most powerful nations wrote and re-wrote the rules to suit their interests. The rules were written differently in the Cold War, when the US and the Soviet Union had to take into account the existence of the other, then they shifted after 1991 to encourage, on the surface, more cooperation and multilateralism, and are now shifting again, as Trump re-positions American foreign policy under the assumption that America is the preponderant global power and needs to use its military and economic might to serve a different interpretation of its interests.

Trump’s gambit may fail, but it is not an incoherent stew of half-baked ideas as critics like to pretend. It is a return to a nationalist and realist foreign policy. But this shift is in keeping with the times. First the 2008 crisis and then Covid caused a return to some aspects of Keynesian economic stimulus and a hardening of borders that have not disappeared with the end of the pandemic. Right wing nationalist-populist ideologies are in the ascendant across the world– Trump is less disruptor-in-chief than a creature of the times. The nationalist re-trenchment across the globe proves– if further proof were needed- of the absurdity of the argument that an anonymous “Empire” of capital and digital flows had replaced American imperialism, as Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt argued. American imperialism never went anywhere- ask Gazans and Ukrainians, who were killed by American bombs and pushed into war with Russia by a Democratic government stuck in Cold War thinking and a closely allied European security establishment haunted by nonsensical fantasies of Russian tanks rolling across the Donbass all the way to Normandy.

Trump is wrong that Zelensky started the war but he was used as a tool by the US and NATO in an overt and publicly acknowledged plan to degrade Russian power. Trump is correct that the war has become a World War one-like stalemate that needs to end. And he is also correct that Ukraine is in a much worse bargaining position and will most likely have to cede territory that it would not have had to ceded had either the Minsk 1 or Minsk 2 treatises been agreed to or Russia engaged in serious talks in December 2022 when a list of negotiating points were sent from Moscow to Washington, only to be arrogantly rebuffed. The Ukrainian people have paid the price.

Can Trump deliver peace, not only in Ukraine, but in the Middle East and globally? One cannot deny that Trump can shape the rhetorical field. He seemingly extemporizes shocking proposals which rarely come to pass, but get everyone’s attention and crack open formerly fixed positions. Trump knows that America still wields massive military and economic power and he is willing to threaten to use it to bend other nations to his agenda. But there are serious tensions and contradictions at work in the overall strategic picture that is emerging.

Looking carefully at the moves Trump has made or is threatening to make, it becomes clear that he is trying to rid himself of the Ukrainian and Middle Eastern entanglements the better to compete exclusively with China for manufacturing share but also for control over the world’s rare earth critical mineral supplies. Trump is not subtle: the cat does not need to get out of the bag because it was never in it. His envoy hands Zelensky a contract to sign over 500 billion dollars worth of rare earths and tells him to shut up and sign. Bad news for Denmark/Greenland, Canada, and perhaps Norway: Trump is proposing a new era of US-Russian Arctic co-operation (i.e., joint domination). None of this is motivated by Trump’s love of Putin, it is designed to weaken the alliance between Putin and Xi. But that is also the strategy’s main weakness.

However much Putin welcomes the feigned respect paid to him by Trump and Rubio, they are setting him on a collision course with the reality of Trump’s desire to hem in and weaken China. Russia is and will remain dependent on China as the major customer for his oil, natural gas, and minerals. European markets for oil and gas are not coming back, and Trump has no intention of helping them come back, because he wants to keep the European market open for American Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) deliveries. Trump also wants to use threatened tariffs as leverage to open up the Indian market for American LNG, which just happens to be another major purchaser of discounted Russian oil. Over the next few years these contradictions are going to amplify. How they will play out is not certain, but it is much more probable that the globe is heading towards a generational political-economic conflict. China cannot lose access to the American market and continue its manufacturing-led economic rise. Putin cannot lose access to the Chinese market for his oil, gas, and minerals. Trump cannot back down from his goal of re-patriating American manufacturing industries. While his commitment to shrinking the American global military footprint is long overdue, no one should mistake his agenda for a commitment to a project of comprehensive, life-valuable, positive social peace. He may well imagine that other countries will fall into line. The evidence from South Africa, Mexico, and even dangerously dependent countries like Canada is that they will not.

Let the American Bastards Freeze in the Dark

Canadian readers of my vintage will remember the Alberta-based bumper sticker campaign inspired by the demand made by an angry caller to a Calgary radio station to “let the Eastern bastards freeze in the dark.” His ire was inspired by Trudeau pere’s National Energy Program and the threat that it posed to provincial jurisdiction over Alberta’s oil and gas resources. Trump’s 25 % tariffs on all Canadian goods imported into the US (10% on oil and gas) imposed on February 1st and then suspended for 30 days has aroused Canadian anger across the country. Ontario premiere Doug Ford went the furthest, arguing that we should cut off electricity and energy supplies. Trudeau fils was not willing to take that dangerous step, at least in the first round of response, but he did announce an escalating series of counter-tariffs. Whether Trudeau’s willingness to offer a robust response, or whether his economic advisors were able to explain the implications of “integrated supply chain,” or whether Trump decided he could attain his ultimate economic goals (shifting investment from Canada and Mexico to the US) by slowly bleeding concessions from Canada and Mexico I cannot say at this point. But what is clear is that the complex set of dependencies that ties the Canadian economy to the American puts Canada in an extremely precarious position.

Political forces that were once against free trade when it was first negotiated in 1987, and then deepened and extended to Mexico in 1993 with the North American Free Trade Agreement, (renegotiated under the first Trump administration and re-christened the United States Mexico Canada Agreement), find themselves forced to defend it. Economic nationalists going back to Harold Innis have warned that the size differential between the Canadian and American economies meant that Canada will always need America more than America needs Canada. Abundant natural resources offer only limited leverage– if there is only one market for the resource (America), then threats to suspend exports are idle: the resource only has commercial value if it is sold, and if there is only an American buyer, then not selling will have even worse economic consequences than paying the tariff. In any case, critics of integration and free trade lost the argument, and now Canada faces its most serious economic problem since the 2008 global financial crisis.

The threat is real, in particular to the auto industry, situated in Southern Ontario. Windsor-Essex where I live could face economic obliteration. I am not exaggerating. Tens of thousands of workers in the assembly and engine plants and dozens of smaller tool and die, injection mold, and parts plants could lose their jobs. Parts go back and forth across the border multiple times. Do the math: if every time a part crosses into the US the manufacturer must pay a 25 % duty, the costs will be enormous. Experts predicted that the entire North American auto industry, dependent as it is on the integrated supply chain and just in time production, could grind to a halt in 7-10 days from the imposition of tariffs. While the fact that American auto workers would be laid off would be sure to get Trump’s attention, it would also get the attention of the owners of parts plants and future investors. Capitalists are risk averse: they will close plants on this side of the border and not make future investments if they are going to be exposed to tariffs. The industry will not disappear tomorrow (because plants cannot just be moved overnight), but overtime the plants will relocate to the US to avoid tariffs, or even the threat. That is Trump’s plan, and it may be starting to work already. Even though the tariffs have been suspended, a number of firms located in Canada have announced lay offs in anticipation that they will be applied in March. But even if they are not, Trump can keep them dangling like the sword of Damocles over Canadian heads.

Perhaps alone amongst nations, Canadian politicians take American political and economic aggression as a personal insult. They rhapsodize about what a good friend Canada has been to the US, what close allies we have been, how special and unique our connection is, how we share the world’s longest undefended border (but not any more, since Trudeau has agreed to further police and militarize it as part of the commitment he made to Trump to stave of the implementation of the tariffs). But they forget both Lord Palmerston and Pierre Eliot Trudeau, the first of whom argued that states have no permanent friends or enemies, but only interests, and the second who warned that when a mouse sleeps next to an elephant, it is always in danger of being crushed. One can disagree or even despise Trump’s tactics, but Trump is the President of the United States and has both the right and the power to impose whatever economic policies he and his advisors believe is in the interest of the United States.

Viewed from the standpoint of American capital, Trump’s politics are contradictory, which explains the mostly critical response from the business establishment. One must not forget that globalization was largely an American-capital driven process: the policy architecture that created the conditions for globalization was called the Washington Consensus. While the trade liberalization that made possible the re-location of manufacturing industries did not harm the bottom line of most industries– indeed, the whole point of relocation was to reduce labour costs and undermine the power of unions– it did gut many smaller American cities and create what is not affectionately known as the “Rust Belt. Some industries were also directly harmed by competition with lower priced Chinese imports– steel comes immediately to mind. All economic policy- and the neo-liberalism that underpinned globalization was a policy, not a distinct form of society– must be understood in terms of its function: to create the conditions for expanded capital accumulation. What we are clearly witnessing is the unravelling of neo-liberal globalization. States have been re-trenching behind stronger borders since 2008, and especially since COVID-19. Trump is part of a global wave of right-wing populist movements coming to power based upon dissatisfaction with the impotence of social democratic parties (in the US, the Democratic Party) in the face of global threats to working-class living standards. As is sadly too often the case, working class anger is directed downward- against immigrants, especially– rather than upward, against the ruling class. Nevertheless, the social and economic problems feeding right-wing populist movements are real.

Which brings us to the crucial, as always, question: what is to be done? And as soon as that question is posed one faces a problem– a paradox, really– that I have been wrestling with, without success, for many years: the short term damage caused by phase transitions between one form of global economic governance and another is real, suggesting that only fundamental, long-term, system transformation can solve the problems, but the short term pain that would be required to reach those long term goals would be at least as bad if not worse than trying to re-float the system, which impedes political mobilization in support of structural changes. Moreover, since structural alternatives are just textbook ideas, people understandably cling to whatever version of the system works for them– tariffs in the pre-free trade world, now free trade– because life requires certainty of need-satisfaction today and tomorrow. If the mortgage must be paid at the end of the month and groceries bought each week, workers are going to mobilize behind those forces that seem best able to secure the social conditions that allow them to do so. Most workers might not have much when compared to the ruling class, but they have a great deal more to lose than their chains.

But they do stay chained to a system whose periodic convulsions and internal transformation threaten their lives and livelihoods. How this paradox between the fact that these system convulsions threaten the very needs that keep people wed to the system is to be solved, I do not know. As is usually the case when an American threat to the Canadian economy begins to take hold, voices cry out that it is time to de-couple from the American economy. This time is no different. Left-nationalist voices have called for but a more self-reliant Canadian economy, voices further to the left have called not only for a more independent but also a democratic socialist economy These calls sound good in the abstract, and in the abstract their “necessity” can also be proven. But they float down from the (not absolutely, but relatively more secure) halls of academia. Making an argument in class to students is one thing, making it in the Penalty Box Lounge across Walker Road from the Windsor Assembly Plant (Canada’s largest manufacturing plant) to auto workers facing immediate job losses would be quite something else entirely.

Sam Gindin grasps the paradox better than most. A long-time leader in the CAW/UNIFOR before leaving for a career as an academic, Gindin understands the lived realty of Canadian workers’ vulnerability to changing American priorities. He is also correct to infer– but it is more like a logical inference than a political program– that the radical alternative- not just de-linking but socialist reconstruction of the Canadian economy, is the only practical alternative. Correct as an inference but not as a political project because neither Gindin nor anyone else could tell the workers’ affected how this economy can be built, how long it would take, how it would function, and how it would employ the manufacturing workers who would certainly lose their jobs as their factories shrank because they were no longer selling into the gigantic American market. Moreover, the crucial question of how a relatively small economy could become an independent bastion of democratic socialism is left unanswered. Serious solidarity between Canadian and American workers seems impossible to imagine right now. The only existing vehicles by which such solidarity could be constructed are unions whose primary function today is job protection, and Canadian workers are facing the problems that they are facing because Trump is selling his agenda as a job-creator. Should it prove to be a job killer– as he has been warned it will- a return to the status quo ante rather than a new era of collective working class struggle is far, far more likely.

Trump is deploying nostalgia for a supposed Golden Age to build an ideological bloc in support of his virulent nationalism. Despair can be tempered by the knowledge that the mandate that he claims for his wrecking-ball approach to governance is much smaller than he claims– only 1/3 of eligible voters cast their ballot for him. But the power vested in the Executive branch is allowing him almost free hand right now. Democrats have, predictably, adopted a ‘make lawyers rich again’ court-based strategy to try to slow him down. But what is needed — Gindin and others are correct– is a renewed democratic socialist project: one that begins from shared interests underlying distinct identities rather than the individual and abstract ‘stories’ and ‘journeys’ of those identities. From shared and universal need-satisfaction as the material condition of the unique and to a society which allows for- as J.S. Mill said beautifully in On Liberty— an open-ended set of “experiments in living,” that is the principle upon which a renewed struggle for a better world must be organized. But it is just a principle, a platitude, really, which can do nothing on its own but requires the force of millions of people working together to put it into practice.

Who will discover the rhetorical and political key to inspiring people to take the risk they will have to take to solve the structural problems that capitalism as such poses with real invention rather than ideological nostalgia?

Readings: Michael J. Albert: Navigating the Polycrisis

Albert’s book is a timely read. Only one week into Trump’s second term he seems determined to enact policies that will exacerbate every problem that Albert examines: climate change, fossil fuel extraction, pandemic readiness, economic competition, international political tensions, and the future of armed violence. Trump, delusional in his emperor’s new clothes, appears to think that viruses and atmospheric chemistry obey Executive Orders and that the historical forces that have slowly but steadily eroded American power since the triumphant days at the end of the Cold War can be arrested because one-third of American voters cast their ballot for him. Material and historical reality will not be cheated by Trump’s arrogance, but he can expedite the most destructive implications of those forces by his reactionary policy. Whether the world proves up to the task of confronting and stopping him before the end of his term remains to be seen. But that he will exacerbate the contradictions of the international system is almost certain.

Albert argues that the world is in the midst of an intensifying polycrisis. The term was coined by former European Commission President Jean-Claude Junker to explain the political, economic, and cultural problems faced by the EU. Albert applies it globally, to the multiple intersecting crisis of what he calls the “world-earth” system. The polycrisis is a “nexus of entwined crises characterized by feedback loops, blurred boundaries, cascade effects, and in many cases mutual amplification.” (2) The global system is confronted with a series of problems of reproduction on multiple levels and scales, from the availability of energy sources, to the climate, unstable hydrological cycles, a food system challenged by scarce land and high emissions, the threat of new information technologies, intensifying political-economic conflicts, and new means of violence in the hands of state and non-state actors. “The planetary polycrisis can be understood as a protracted phase of critical transition and turbulence that is unfolding simultaneously across multiple sub-systems of the world-earth system– from political economy and finance to climate, biodiversity, energy, food, disease, global security, and identity.”(19) Each of these systems interact in ways that can either exacerbate degenerative or catalyze regenerative trends.

Albert situates himself in the tradition of the Club of Rome’s celebrated and vilified Limits to Growth report of 1974 (updated, 2004) (64-5). Against the tide of criticism that the report initially received, Albert argues that the quantitative futures modelling that the report pioneered is an essential part of ecological, social, political, and economic problem solving. While he notes that models are generic maps that cannot provide clairvoyant foresight, we need them in order to understand where the world might be going, and where we might best try to steer it. Albert is neither a technotopian nor a catastrophist: he has a political agenda but he does not let that agenda skew his reading of the data. He is confident that, in principle, human beings have the political and scientific intelligence and practical and technological know-how to solve the polycrisis, but he notes that even the best case scenarios will take decades to implement and that even our best efforts might not be sufficient to avoid the worst case scenario.

Albert begins by noting that there is an unfortunate gap between qualitative social criticism on one side and quantitative scientific modelling on the other. He argues that social scientists, Marxists, and philosophers need to pay much greater attention to problems studied by “the earth system sciences, energy studies, ecological economics,, and other fields that highlight the geophysical parameters that will constrain possible futures of capitalism.” (9) Albert is correct to single out for criticism in this regard utopian socialists like Aaron Bastani whose “fully automated luxury communism” completely ignores the constraints of material reality. The capacity to extrapolate technological fixes from existing capacities is one thing, but actually scaling those technologies up or realizing their idealized potentials is quite another. One can imagine that we can mine asteroids and genetically engineer future human beings with superhero powers, but the technoptopian imagination cannot prove that their fantasy solutions will work or guarantee that they will not create even worse problems.

Albert’s critique of technotopian hand-waving is welcome, as his much needed critique of the creeping idealism of much of the Left and the ambivalent or even anti-scientific attitude that underlies the argument that science is just one narrative amongst many and that objective, material reality is a social construction all the way down. When material reality confronts those same leftists with objective threats to life– a pandemic or anthropogenic climate change– suddenly material reality becomes relevant again. Social constructivist critics of science are thus forced into ad hoc cherry picking of results: climate science and vaccines good, the bio-medical science of sex and evolutionary theory bad. But the same evolutionary theory that explains the reality and importance of biological sex in the development of the large brains that can invent social constructivism underlies the research that led to mRNA vaccines that helped fight COVID. It is true that natural science cannot solve social problems– only changed social practices can do that. But it can– and Albert shows how– help us understand that any social system is going to have to contend with physical forces that social theory cannot deconstruct.

Albert thus aims to synthesis the power of quantitative modelling with the Marxist critique of capitalism to defend an eco-socialist future as the best– most ecologically sound and socially just– future system. But he is clear-eyed about the impediments to that future. The primary impediment is the political organization of a global movement capable of supplanting right-wing populist and technocratic defenders of capitalism. But even if an eco-socialist movement is politically successful it will still face the intersecting and interacting material problems caused by the planetary system. If population continues to grow in that eco-socialist future, for example, then economies will have to grow too. If economies and populations continue to grow then energy demand will continue to rise, food demand will rise, and neighbouring socialist communities could still find themselves in conflict over lands, resources, or water. Successful solutions to these problems do not follow from the fact of worker and community control over the means of production. Albert rightly criticizes Marxists for typically underplaying the challenges posed by material scarcity and unintended consequences of different technical fixes.(78-9)

The great merit of the book is that Albert handles the empirical and disciplinary complexity of the argument and presents the different scenarios he maps with enough detail and dynamism that the reader begins to see the complex interactions between the variables without getting lost in the particulars and losing the all important sense of direction that his mappings are supposed to provide. He imagines different scenarios but ensures that the reader can always identify the through line of argument, what he calls the “planetary problematic. “The planetary problematic is the nexus of intersecting problems that impels and constrains the self-organization of the world-earth system, creating a possibility space composed of not-yet actual trajectories, attractors, and bifurcations within them.” (94) I did find his use of technical terms from the the language of the mathematics of chaos and complexity theory (attractor, dissipative structure, etc.) clashed with the narrative organization of the argument. Unless one is going to provide actual mathematical models there is no reason to apply terms like “attractor” to possible forms of social stability. An attractor is an emergent equilibrium towards which a chaotic state tends. History does not spontaneously tend towards an equilibrium state: social solutions must be argued over, fought for, and imposed.

That said, I was nevertheless impressed at the lucidity of his presentation of the complex ways in which attempts to solve one problem can exacerbate problems in another dimension. The issue of complex interactions cannot be solved by simply asserting that society is a totality and that a change in social relations will by its nature solve everything. Albert rejects the Hegelian-Marxist notion of totality because it is simplistic. Instead he turns to the idea of an “assemblage.” The term derives from the work of Gilles Deleuze, but Albert adopts the interpretation of Miguel Delanda. (89) He uses it to express the fact that elements of a system “are not logically coherent networks of ideas and beliefs … but rather looser configurations that nonetheless tend to produce distinctive patterns of thinking and feeling.”(106). Each facet of the polycrisis has its own structure and exerts its own forces, but that structure and those forces are also effected by changes to other independent but connected variables. Thus, “we confront a predicament that is more than the sum of its parts– a multiplicity of intersecting crises that should be studied as holistically as possible in order to illuminate its possible futures.” (61)

Navigating the polycrisis is therefore fraught with unintended consequences. The secular stagnation of the economy might be overcome by a new technological breakthrough, but that breakthrough might endanger lives and civil liberties if it emerges from an unregulated AI industry. The food crisis can be solved by increasing production, but increasing production can exacerbate the extinction crisis by converting more land to agricultural use, depriving species of their habitats. Economic growth might exacerbate the ecological crisis, but economic contraction can strengthen right-wing forces and intensify geo-political conflict. Massive investment in renewable energy might accelerate ‘Green” growth” and reduce carbon levels, but it might also generate competitive scrambles for rare earth materials. By mapping these interactions carefully, Albert hopes to improve the quality of political struggle and public policy, all the while noting, with appropriate modesty, that the complexity of material reality exceeds even the most detailed mapping exercize.

A notable strength of the book is that Albert connects his political-economic and ecological analysis to the all-important existential dimension of life. Crises are periods of change and transition, but periods of change and transition are also periods of intense anxiety. Some can resolve their anxieties by working to solve the problems, but others (a plurality, at the moment, in the United States and Europe, at least), try to recover meaning by embracing, often violently, a nostalgic interpretation of the past. Albert understands that life needs purposes as well as calories, and that the absence of purpose can cause people to lash out against the forces that they fear are threatening old certainties. It is not simply irrationality, stupidity, or xenophobia that motivates so many people to embrace simplistic right-wing populist slogans. Underneath those movements lies real insecurity and vulnerability. “The Existential problematic refers to the problem of creating forms of collective meaning, identity, and belonging.” It receives “less attention,” Albert notes, but “it is nevertheless essential to include it” because the navigation of the polycrisis requires political action and political motivations are shaped by the existential problematic.(105-6) I agree that this problematic is the most difficult to solve, but I would add that an effective solution must go deeper than merely countering right-wing populism with a politically effective left-wing populist movement. Ultimately, a solution to the existential problematic requires a value system that affirms finite earthly life as the ultimate value. Albert’s argument could have benefited from more systematic attention to the nature of life as the ultimate value. His argument presupposes that principle but he does not examine the different forms of life-value or provide a criterion (such as the ‘primary axiom of value’ developed in the work of John McMurtry) to distinguish life-coherent from life-destructive existential dispositions and value-systems.

Albert’s most detailed analyses are reserved for the exploration of how different ways of resolving one dimension of the polycrisis might affect other dimensions under different social regimes. He first examines how different strategies of system-management and change might operate in the socio-ecological and political-military subsystems, asking how different policy regimes– business as usual, Green Keynesianism, and different varieties of eco-socialist transition– will handle problems thrown up by climate change, resource scarcity, food supply, energy mix, and existential crises. Each solution has political and military implications: trying to hang on to old patterns of fossil fuel driven economic growth will intensify competition between states and increase the likelihood of military conflicts over increasingly scarce resources. However, Albert is careful to note that not every version of eco-socialism entails harmonious and non-violent global relationships. Some versions could see eco-socialist societies try to wall themselves off from others, while frustrated activists might adopt uncompromising, violent means of struggle (which would likely be met with severe police and military repression). While some of his political-military scenarios resemble a dystopic science fiction movie, none are completely adventitious but all are grounded in existing political tendencies and technological possibilities.

The book concludes with seven global outcomes of the polycrisis. He does not assign probabilties to the seven possibilities but sketches the trajectories that would lead to system-breakdown, neo-feudalism, volatile techno-leviathan, stable techno-leviathan, ecomodernist socialism, fortress degrowth, or abolitionist ecosocialism (226, 228-235).

I will not reconstruct these scenarios in any detail but simply note the distinguishing features of each. System-breakdown would occur if the world continues to try to save fossil fuel driven capitalism. In that case collapse– “irreversible breakdown in the structures, relations, and feedbacks that previously reproduced a particular socio-economic system, resulting in a new equillibrium that is less “complex” (147) might prove unavoidable. Collapse would not necessarily mean human extinction — society could could eventually be reconstructed, as feudalism reconstructed organized social life after the collapse of the Roman Empire– but it cannot be ruled out, either.

The other trajectories that Albert charts are attempts to stave off collapse through varying degrees of social regulation and change which rely on various degrees of consent or coercion. Albert calls the second worst case “neo-feudalism.” Neo-feudalism would be a response to a near-collapse scenario in which various forms of collective agents try to seal themselves off from the most destructive effects of the crisis. The nation state form might break down into smaller constituencies, some managed by private corporate powers, but all bent on maintaining elite lifestyles for the ruling class. (229)

The next two scenarios: stable and volatile ‘techno-leviathan’ are closer to existing patterns of nationalist retrenchement behind more ruthlessly enforced borders. Trump 2.0 prefigures in some respects what techno-leviathan might look like. In both scenarios, new surveillance and military technologies are used to police and repress restive populations. Intensifying food, climate, and economic crises combined with political resistance to structural change lead ruling classes to adopt a Hobbesian solution to social conflict. States increase their monopoly on the means of violence in order to better stamp out dissent. In the stable scenario nation states are able to manage internal and external conflict and maintain economic growth (whose fruits are appropriated by the wealthy); in the volatile variant internal and external conflicts predominate. Although surveillance and population control technologies would manage dissent and resistance, a significant segment of the population might consent to increased repression if it meant they were able to maintain their high-levels of consumption.(229-232)

The final set of scenarios would require significant degrees of structural and normative transformation. While these are generally more hopeful, none but the final– abolitionist eco-socialism– are without political dangers. Albert calls the first more hopeful trajectory ecomodernist socialism. In this variant fossil fuels are gradually phased out and renewable energy and the continued growth of digital technologies drives on-going economic growth. Albert speculates (not unreasonably, given the levels of investment in renewable energy) that China could lead this development. He labels the second hopeful the scenario ‘fortress degrowth.’ In this case some states complete the energy transition and create a steady-state economy, but try to reserve the benefits of those transformations for their own citizens. Right-wing or even eco-fascist variants cannot be excluded (although he notes that most eco-socialists would refuse to call fortress de-growth eco-socialist if it tends in a politically repressive direction) (233-34).

The final scenario is the most utopian: a complete democratic eco-socialist society in which the different structures of oppression and violent domination are overcome, a cooperative international order is achieved, ecological pressure on the earth’s life-support systems is relaxed, technology is utilized to better satisfy human needs and free life-time from alienated labour. Albert again displays admirable restraint by not predicting that such a future is certain or even likely. Even if it is possible to achieve, he cautions– rightly– that romantic versions of “revolution or bust” politics will not advance the cause. If it comes about, it will only be through decades of gradual struggle that focuses on achieving certain mediating plateaus (Guaranteed Basic Income, freedom from fossil fuels, etc) which make the climb to the next peak concretely possible.

In the abolitionist eco-socialist society “serving life and reducing suffering is an end in itself.” (241) Here the need to cash out this platitude makes itself felt: what does it mean to serve life as an end in itself? Does it mean to strive to create as many life-forms as possible given finite carrying capacity of the earth? What happens when the demands of human life conflict with the demands of other life forms, as they presumably will given finite space in every imaginable social scenario? As for human life, what are the limits to individual self-realization, given the reality of other people’s interests and needs? If Albert is correct (and I think that he is) and progressive political struggles must think systematically about the future, then it follows by the same reasoning that they cannot rest content with slogans about the intrinsic value of life, but must also explicate what that means concretely, given the material, social, and existential realities of life on earth under all social configurations.

The Trump Effect?

Let me begin by saying that I hope for the sake of the residents of Gaza as well as the Israeli hostages and their families that this week’s ceasefire agreement not only brings a permanent end to the genocidal violence of the war but also creates the conditions in which Gazans can begin to rebuild their lives and Palestinians as a nation can achieve the state for which they have been struggling for eighty years.

That said, political analysis must be conducted with the head, not the heart. The head suggests that this ceasefire is most likely a temporary interruption of the war rather than the start of a permanent peace. No one knows what Trump’s envoy said in the reportedly tense meeting with Netanyahu, but I think it most unlikely that he threatened to cut off the supply of weapons. Did he offer a quid pro quo: agree to the ceasefire and America will continue to provide political cover for settlement expansion? No sooner had the agreement been signed and endorsed by the Israeli cabinet than Washington was promising to unlock delayed deliveries and ensure comprehensive re-supply. Incoming Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth said in his Senate confirmation hearing that Israel retains the right to kill every member of Hamas. Keep in mind that Hamas is not only a guerilla army but a social movement. Perhaps even worse, incoming Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee does not regard the illegal settlements in the West bank as illegal or settlements. And worse still: the day before the ceasefire was to go into effect, Netanyahu warned that this first phase was only a temporary pause to the fighting and that both Biden and Trump assured him that Israel had the right to restart the war if they chose.

The odds of such a pretext being found or created are much higher than this ceasefire holding and paving the way for the reconstruction of Gaza.

In the short term, Trump manages to get credit for the ceasefire (shades of the release of American hostages in Iran immediately upon the inauguration of Ronald Reagan in 1980). What exactly he will eventually get credit for remains to be seen. Everyone is right to celebrate the ceasefire, but that is only the most basic precondition of Gazans being able to rebuild their lives, and it does nothing to advance the broader struggle for Palestinian self-determination.

Hamas will try to spin the agreement as a victory, but what have they won? The release of prisoners? The Palestinian struggle for self-determination is not a struggle for the release of political prisoners. Moreover, most of those who will be released in the first phase were arrested after October 7th. In other words, had Oct 7th not happened, those prisoners would not have been in prison. Those who have been convicted of more serious crimes will be released to third countries. Should they try to sneak back into Gaza you can be certain that Israel would treat that subterfuge as a violation of the agreement and relaunch the war.

But the bigger question is: setting aside all humanist concern for the massive loss of life, did October 7th advance the Palestinian cause? The answer is no. Hamas has been pulverized as an organized fighting force. Its leadership and best trained cadres have been killed. Anthony Blinken noted that they have probably recruited as many members as they have lost, but recruitment is one thing, being a militarily effective force is another. Where will these new recruits be trained, and who will supply them with weapons? Since the imprimatur of Trump is now on this ceasefire– and whatever else Trump is he is a narcissistic ego-maniac– direct American involvement could not be ruled out if Hamas were to start openly training these new recruits. Hamas was banking on a general uprising in the West Bank as well as support from Hezbollah and Iran. There was an upsurge of struggle in the West Bank, but no general uprising, and the biggest impact of October 7th there was to dramatically intensify Israeli military activity. Hezbollah did support the struggle in Gaza until its leadership was killed and its fighting positions decimated in relentless airstrikes that forced it into a ceasefire. Iran engaged Israel on two occasions, but has been sufficiently cowed by the tactical defeat of Hezbollah to back off for the moment. The loss of Syria as a transit route for Iranian weapons into Lebanon is a serious setback for Tehran. In any case, they will likely have their hands full dealing with a renewal of Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign. As for the Houthis who continue to waste the scarce resources of one of the world’s poorest countries on “resistance,” their resistance is futile, militarily ineffective, and politically counter-productive.

Hamas can claim that Israel did not achieve its maximalist objectives in launching the war, but that is a distraction from the main issue. Did Hamas achieve its objectives of initiating a final phase of the struggle for self-determination that would lead to the defeat of Israel? Clearly, October 7th was a massive political failure. It may come to be known as the worst strategic decision in the history of national liberation struggles. It humiliated and embarrassed Israel, but successful national liberation struggles are are not about embarrassing the enemy but achieving national liberation. Moreover, that humiliation only served to amp up the ferocity of Israel’s response. One did not have to be an expert in Middle Eastern affairs to predict that Israel would completely flatten Gaza after losing more than 1000 soldiers’ and citizens’ lives. I am not an expert, and I did predict just that the day after the attacks.

Who is in the stronger position today, Hamas or Israel? Israel has suffered in the court of global public opinion, Spain and Ireland have recognized Palestinian statehood, and Netanyahu and Gallant have warrants for their arrest. The International Court of Justice continues to deliberate on the question of whether Israel committed genocide during its war. If completely destroying the life conditions of 2.3 million people is not genocide, what is? But France and Italy have said they will not arrest Netanyahu if he visits and Israel is unlikely to suffer any practically meaningful consequences even if the court concludes that genocide was committed so long as it enjoys American support. The idea that such support will be lost under Trump is almost unthinkable.

The most frightening thing about the situation is that there are people in the Israeli government to the right of and more extreme than Netanyahu. It would be nice if the majority of people learned from catastrophes like October 7th or 9/11 and asked themselves: what did our side do to help create the conditions in which an opposed group thought that a homicidal rampage was necessary? But that is almost never what happens. Wounded and humiliated people demand vengeance and give power and license to people ruthless enough to exact it. More circumspect, self-critical, and rational voices are sidelined and cowed into silence. Israeli’s demonstrated in the hundreds of thousands for the return of the hostages but it will be a long time before any Israeli government will make any concessions on the road to a Palestinian state.

At present, the political future of Gazans and Israelis is in the hands of two gangs of fundamentalists and an erratic, easily distracted American President. I see little hope for a revival of creative and constructive thinking during Trump’s term of office. How can the Israeli peace movement find the words to sway a majority of Israeli’s that the horrors will never stop until Palestinian self-determination is achieved? How can Palestinians create a new generation of leaders who can find the words to sway those in a position to force concessions- Israeli citizens and American governments– to take concrete steps towards the creation of a Palestinian state? Equally importantly, how can they keep the world’s attention focused on the festering structural problem once the ceasefire takes effect and the mind of global civil society wanders?

America the Isolated

The 51st state, eh? From my study I can see the lights of the Ambassador Bridge at night; if I walk to the bottom of my driveway, I can see across the river to Detroit. America is so close, and so far.

Decisions, decisions.

Would we still be able to buy Beavertails, or would Bearclaws become the dominant fried dough confection? Could we still call Corndogs Pogos? Could we negotiate a carve out for ketchup chips? Would we be forced to drink Vernors, or would Canada Dry ginger ale still be sold? Could we still make rye, or would bourbon become the national whiskey?

And spelling: would we have to drop the ‘u’ in neighbour and adopt other Noah Webster barbarisms like ‘thru’ for ‘through?’ If I say, “I was really pissed last night,” will my new co-citizens understand that I was drunk, or will they think that I was angry with someone? Would Windsorites in time develop the nasally Midwestern drawl of Michiganders? The metric system would be gone, but it never really took hold of the popular imagination anyway.

On the other hand, I wouldn’t have to wait in traffic at the border if there were no border.

Hmm…. no more wait times at the border.

I am not a nationalist or a dogmatic anti-American. I am not going to boycott Tigers’ or Red Wings’ games or give up my membership at the Detroit Institute of Arts because 1/3 of eligible American voters cast their ballot for Donald Trump. Still, joining up? It would be ideal if there were no borders or boundaries dividing up the globe and everyone could just wander freely where they will. But people do not live in ideals. There are borders, and, like a comforter on a cold winter night, they create a warm space in which one can feel at home. There is no place like home, wherever home is, and I just happened to have been thrown into being here, in Canada.

I have no illusions about the place- every problem that bedevils America can be found here. Our reputation for peace and equality rests more on foreigners’ ignorance of our history than our realities. Still, there is no place like home: one develops a feel for a place and appreciates ease of motion through the culture in which one grows up. So I feel attached to Canada by temperment and habit. The pace of life is just a little slower, our public policy perhaps just a little more cautious. Public health care is a good idea, even if the practice is more and more wanting. There is no abortion law, and most Canadians do not think that their country was put on earth as a beacon towards which all other ships of state must steer– or be sunk. Canadians are not as nice as our reputation makes out, but there is some civic humility at odds with the Manifest Destiny triumphalism of our neighbours– or should I say neighbors.

Most Canadians agree. A poll taken in the wake of Trump’s bluster about annexing Canada found only 13% in support becoming the 51st state, So, while millions of Canadians are happy to winter in Florida and Arizona and thousands more will no doubt continue to seek their fame and fortune in Hollywood (if it does not does not burn to the ground), most of us are attached to our independence. So thanks, Donald, for the offer, but maybe we’ll just keep muddling along, attached but separate.

As with much of what he says, Trump’s chatter about annexing Canada is part provocation and part feint. Trump is a carnival barker and an illusionist. His bluster is sleight of hand to distract people from the real agenda. Remember the border wall? It did not get built, but the number of migrants crossing the Southern border rapidly declined, because his rhetoric dissuaded them from coming in the first place. Annexing Canada is drawn from the same playbook. The USMC free trade agreement is due to be renegotiated and Trump is simply positioning the US to extract more concessions from Canada and Mexico.

If I were a poker player I would love to play someone like Trump. He pushes his chips in every hand. Occasionally a player like that will not be bluffing, but the math says that his hand will be weaker than he thinks more times than not. However, in order to beat him you have to have the courage to push your chips in too and call his bluff. Remarkably, few players do.

Trump’s threats had Justin Trudeau scurrying down to Mar a Lago to grovel at Trump’s knee. No sooner did he get off the plane from Florida than a billion dollar border security package was unveiled. Denmark similarly has promised to make billion dollar military investments in Greenland to appease Trump. The situation there is made even more complicated by the fact that Greenland wants its independence from Denmark. Self-determination is their right, but they ought to think very carefully about whether the time is right to exercize it. Denmark is a member of NATO and the EU. Those memberships would help Greenland resist any unilateral American moves to legally incorporate it as some sort of dependency like Guam or Puerto Rico. But alone, a nation of 55 000 people would be totally at the mercy of American power. Trump does not respond to moral suasion, only counter-power, and such a small nation would have none.

A better example than the Canadians and Danes of how to respond to Trump has been set by the Mexican President Claudia Steinbaum. Instead of genuflecting, she repaid Trump in his own currency, mocking his proposals and reminding Trump how much of America was once Mexico. Trump is not only a carnival barker, he is a bully. Bullies are not tough but only seem so because they pick on weaker victims. As soon as a victim stands up for themselves the bully moves on to an easier mark. When all the victims stand together there are no more targets and the bully either stops trying to intimidate people or ends his days isolated and lonely.

Trump is motivated by nostalgia– make American great again implies that there was a time when America was great, but no longer. He forgets that the time for which he is nostalgic, the early twentieth century when American manufacturing and science led the world, was reconfigured by American economic power because the old model no longer worked for American corporations. High wages and working class power helped create the stagflation crisis of the early 1970s. Exporting manufacturing industries undercut working class power, mass migration, legal and illegal, increased the supply of cheap labour for service industries, generating downward pressure on wages, while making the American dollar the global reserve currency ensured American control over the terms of trade, vastly increasing the power of Wall Street in the global economy and ensuring American political economic hegemony.

Trump’s nostalgia may be rooted in a correct assessment of the relative weakening of American hegemony. China, India, Russia, Brazil and the other members of the growing BRICS bloc are not going to take dictation from Donald Trump. While it is too early to say what a new configuration of global political economic power is going to look like, there is little doubt that such a re-organization is underway. No one nation, person, or movement is powerful enough to resist the tectonic forces of the global political economic system. Trump’s braggadocio masks the fact that America is less able to steer the global system in its own interests than at the end of the Cold War, when America stood alone, economically and ideologically, as the global hegemon. Who today seriously looks to the United States for moral leadership?

But global trade still flows through Wall Street. The American dollar will not be dethroned anytime soon, and America retains enough destructive military power to destroy the earth a few times over. Trump is going to find out very quickly that America has less power than it did when he left office the first time, not because of Biden’s mistakes, but because the nations of the rest of the world have begun defining their interests against America’s. They have seen sanctions and asset seizures and technology embargoes deployed against America’s enemies, but they have not sidled up, begging to become friends. They have learned that America cannot be trusted, and they have re-worked trade routes and invested heavily in technological development to free themselves even further from the American yoke.

Trump is not as stupid as he sometimes sounds. He knows that American power has declined. His threats and posturing are transparent efforts to put competitors off balance. His approach is not always ineffective in the short term, but over the long haul his tactics will force other nations together in blocs like BRICS and accelerate the very decline that Trump is trying to arrest.

The University is Dying, Again

The dawn of the new year always generates ambivalent emotions. People resolve to overcome all the bad habits that gave some pleasure to their lives, media outlets compile their best of everything lists, while professional doomsayers sing their yearly Jeremiads, warning that the next year will be the year when everything that has been falling apart for the past year, and the year before that, and the year before that, finally collapses. The climate, the return of Trump, runaway malevolent AI, another pandemic, nuclear conflict with Russia … we are all going to die!

But maybe we will struggle through another year, despite Trump and natural gas stoves. And if we are still breathing come January 2nd, we will have to soldier on, facing the mundane problems we have always faced about how to run major social institutions, how to communicate with each other, how to evaluate where we are as societies, how to identify and solve problems. For most of human history these tasks were reserved for social elites, typically men with some sort of aristocratic pedigree which they took to be a sign of superior talent and capacity which entitled them to decide on behalf of everyone else how society would be governed. These elites were capable of works of epochal intelligence (as in ancient Greece, whose language gives us the English world aristocracy– rule of the best). But the free time required to walk, reflect, and compose the words that still resound today was– as Aristotle admitted– purchased at the cost of the freedom of women and slaves who did the work so that the “great souled” people could spread their genius.

We easily forget that the canonical Greek philosophers, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, were critics of Athenian democracy and defenders of slavery. Plato’s Republic is an extended reflection on how the principle of democratic equality corrupts the polis. In a democracy, he argues in Book Nine, the slave is as valuable as the master, the son as valuable as the father, and everyone’s position on matters that concern them is considered in the deliberative assembly even if they lack the expertise that wise decisions require. Therefore, he concludes, democratic equality is a contradictory equality between unequals, doomed to collapse. Democracy, he concludes, is a violation of the social conditions of intellectual excellence, a dangerous consorting with the lowest of human desires, and a fatal step towards disorder that can only end in tyranny.

There are shades of this aristocratic critique of democracy in the left-liberal reaction to the re-election of Trump. While they do not always say so out loud, there is an undertone of disdain for working class Trump voters: maybe they just aren’t smart enough to understand their own interests. After all, the core of Trump’s base are men without university degrees. If people were better educated, then perhaps they would stop entrusting their interests to autocrats like Trump and Putin. Had they read The Republic they would know that tyrants are elected because they promise to protect the interests of the poor.

In contemporary politics as in Newtonian mechanics, for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction. The left-liberal critique of the masses produces an abstract democratic-populist defense of the masses. It is difficult to assign any precise ideological identity to those who disagree with Trump but would defend the right of working class people to vote for him, but one common thread that links what I might call left-conservative populists with right-conservative populists is a gnawing angst about the state of popular culture and the educational institutions that produce the people who shape it. (i am not sure this term is correct, but it is at least not oxymoronic. Andrew Collier has written an excellent essay on the philosophical overlap between Marx and classical conservatism). Rather like Plato and his aristocratic friends, left and right populists worry that there is a destructive slackening of standards and values and that the educational system, and in particular, universities, share a great deal of the blame.

One could understand such a criticism coming from classical conservatives, for whom the democratization of higher education after World War Two was synonymous with slackening of standards. “Undergraduates without Latin and Greek!! Preposterous! What’s next, eating fruit with one’s hands at High Table!?!” But how can populists, who, after all, claim to be on the side of the people, worry that the consequences of the democratization of higher education are in effect destroying it? The question is not easy to answer. I want to look at two recent examples of what I am calling, for lack of a better word at the moment a left-conservative populist critique of higher education to tease out what is true in their arguments from what is a false romanticization of a past that never existed.

Joanna Williams (“The Death Throes of the University are Upon Us”) and Joel Kotkin, (“The American University is Rotting From Within”), both writing in spiked-online, warn that the cultural politics of the twenty-first century campus are destroying the intellectual integrity of the institution. They are not wrong to warn that universitiess in the United States, the United Kingdom (and Canada) are in a period of serious crisis. Kotkin notes that undergraduate enrollment in the United States has declined from 18.1 million in 2010 to 15.4 million in 2021. The decline is even steeper in the arts and humanities. In England, Williams adds, amidst the general decline in enrollment symbolically important programs like Philosophy at the University of Kent and English at the University of Canterbury have closed. In Canada and especially Ontario, universities, in particular smaller and comprehensive schools, are facing dramatic budget crises as a result of decades of government underfunding and a sharp decline in international student enrollments as a result of recent changes to federal immigration policies. My home institution, the University of Windsor, is facing a deficit of perhaps as much as 30 million dollars, which is about ten percent of its annual revenues. The Vice President of Finance has warned that the deficit could require “catastrophic” cuts.

(At present the administration has not presented a comprehensive plan to address the crisis. When they do, I will return to the political economic dimensions of the crisis of universities. Here I want to focus on the pedagogical and political thrust of Kotkin’s and Williams’ critique).

That thrust is nicely summed up by the subheading of Kotkin’s essay: “The modern academy is a threat to reason, liberty, and Western civilization.” What follows is mixture of anecdote and statistics that purports to prove that there has been a fundamental transformation in the nature of academic reason. Whereas universities were once focused on the dispassionate pursuit of objective truth that mission has been overtaken by a Cultural Revolution-like indoctrination campaign led by tender-hearted, weak-kneed, and soft-minded left liberals. Williams paints an analogous picture of the English university.

The targets will be familiar to those who follow the institutional politics of the contemporary English language university. There are purportedly absurd infiltrations of a “social justice” agenda into science, such as the engineering assignment that Williams discusses that asked students at King’s College to create ‘a product for LGBTQ+ people focused on providing education or safe spaces.” There are complaints about the decline of literacy, the capacity of students to read complete texts, lamentations about the proliferation of trigger warnings on classic literary and philosophical texts, politically correct changes to departmental nomenclature, and a climate of general hostility to the achievements of Western civilization adapted from anti-imperialist critiques of colonialism and racism. Kotkin sums up the problems:

“Ideologically homogenous universities have become something akin to indoctrination camps, where traditional Western values are trashed while woke ideology is promoted. Not surprisingly, the graduates of today’s universities are inclined to maintain rigid positions on various issues, confident of their own superior intelligence and perspicuity while being intolerant of other views. They also tend to be not particularly proud to be American. The kind of support professors gave to the war effort in the Second World War would be hard to imagine today.”

There is much truth is Williams’ and Kotkin’s arguments. Trigger warnings are childish and anti-intellectual; there have been dozens if not hundreds of cases of academics fired for violating institutionally imposed ideological lines; scientific method is often caricatured and misunderstood as an ideological construct of ‘the West,’ “inclusion” is often promoted at the expense of intellectually essential confrontation, contestation, and rational debate, and the research and teaching mission of universities too often clouded by platitudinous and practically useless commitments to extraneous political goals like “decolonization.” Williams is correct: academics who value their vocation as teachers and researchers must oppose these tendencies to the extent that they interfere with the teaching and research mission of the university.

However, both Williams and Kotkin are both guilty of romanticizing the history of the university and confusing demographic uniformity of the student body and professoriate with “reason, liberty, and Western Civilization.” The historical fact of the matter is that the nineteenth century model of the university which still forms the basic structure of the contemporary university was populated exclusively by white middle and upper class men who had time to devote to their studies because they did not have to work to pay tuition. The university system expanded rapidly in the nineteen sixties to absorb the Baby Boom generation, allowing working class students to access higher education for the first time, but also women, Blacks, and other minority groups. The transformation of curricula still ongoing today and often denounced as intellectually weak and anti-Western, the introduction of various forms of critical theory that questioned the philosophical, literary, and artistic canon and exposed links between political, economic, and cultural power and science, objectivity, and truth, was largely the result of struggle against a suffocating normality which young people in revolt against their parents’ world refused to accept without question any longer.

One generation’s revolution is the next generation’s normality and the new generation’s object of struggle. The ‘critique of Western civilization” that Kotkin decries is largely a function of the fact that Western societies and student bodies have become even more multicultural at the same time as voices from the Global South and Indigenous peoples refuse to be spoken for any longer and rightly insist on speaking in their own voices against the worst of Western civilization: imperialism, colonialism, racism. While the nations of the Global South have achieved political independence, the forces that oppressed them politically continue to operate on the socio-economic level. All one needs to do is to examine the flows of wealth from Global South to North and consider the degree of material inequality to understand that the history of imperialism and colonialism continues to damage the lives of people in the Global South. If the worst of Western civilization is that legacy of racism, its best aspect is its capacity for self-criticism that underlies both scientific method and philosophical questioning. Indeed, systematic criticism of “Western civilization” was the hallmark of The Enlightenment: read Condorcet, or L’Abee Raynal, or Diderot if you want to find impassioned denunciations of what passed for civilization at the time. Far from a dispassionate and neutral exercise of reason in pursuit of objective truth, the best scientists and philosophers at the time consciously deployed science and reason against established structures of rule and assumptions about what is true, valuable, and just. Today’s critics of Western civilization carry on that legacy (even if they often misunderstand ‘Enlightenment reason’ as part of the problem).

Kotkin and Williams might agree, but would perhaps rejoin that social criticism is not the problem but the illiberal and anti-intellectual effort to mold the university exclusively in their own ideological image. These efforts extend to efforts to get institutions themselves to take positions on key political struggles like the Israel-Gaza war. These are both real problems: the university, as the name implies, is an institution devoted to the free production, dissemination, and critique of knowledge. Academic freedom is an institutional right whose purpose is to ensure that these defining missions can be pursued. It cannot be qualified by any institutionally-imposed political postures. Moreover, the mission also cannot be qualified by groups outside of the university, whether corporate donors or politically mobilized groups trying to impose their agenda on teaching and research. The academic mission of universities is negated to the precise extent that the principle of freedom of inquiry, teaching, and mutual criticism is subordinated to money or particular political-cultural agendas.

At the same time, just because it is a space for free inquiry, teaching, and argument, the university campus is a politicized space. The wave of encampments that swept North American and UK campuses this summer were fully in keeping with the best traditions of the critical exercise of reason. What side do you think Voltaire or Diderot would have been on were they alive to witness the systematic destruction of cities that were home to 2.3 million people? Are babies being left to freeze, women and children forced to beg for food, and men stripped to their underwear and paraded around being treated with the dignity that Kant argued was the due of every human being? The fact that some protesters made some stupid comments in support of Hamas does not negate the right to protest the Israeli response. What is Israel’s reflex attack on any critic as anti-Semitic but an attempt to short-circuit debate of its history and policies?

As for the much maligned Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion agenda, one must not forget that its original incarnation as “Affirmative Action” was necessary to open the academy to women and Blacks. It too was attacked as a dangerous weakening of standards, when in fact it was an expansion of perspectives beyond the white middle and upper class men who completely dominated all academic fields prior to the 1960’s. The broadening of voices engaged in teaching and research inevitably broadened the range of subjects and methodologies taught and utilized, but that broadening was– and should still be understood as– rooted in the university’s mission to encompass the evolving whole– the universe– of human intellectual work. The universe of human knowledge encompasses both empirical methods that must be judged on the basis of their results and critical methods which expose the historical and social forces that always act shape knowledge production. That social and political forces shape knowledge production does not mean that knowledge and truth are nothing but social constructions. The atomic weight of nitrogen is the same in Beijing as it is in Cambridge, Massachusetts. But who gets access to scientific education, who gets positions at the most prestigious universities, which research programs are regarded as credible and which regarded as pseudo-science, have all been affected by non-scientific forces and assumptions. The belief that there was a a time when science was a pure pursuit of objective truth now compromised by ideological agendas is simply untrue. Consider only the history of military funding of scientific research at the best American universities. Is the US military not motivated by ideological concerns? Truth is not reducible to a social construction, but the institutions that pursue the truth are always structured by social forces that are motivated by social, political, economic, and ideological motives that determine what is regarded as legitimate and illegitimate scientific work. When critical methodologies help us understand those forces they actually make scientific work more scientific. Ideological influences compromise scientific objectivity, but if they remain undiagnosed their distorting influence cannot be corrected.

That is not to say that the DEI agenda cannot become a threat to academic freedom. David Robinson, Executive Director of the Canadian Association of University Teachers argued in a recent edition of the CAUT Bulletin that there is a difference between academics committing themselves to curriculum development and institutions mandating commitment to administrative DEI programs as a condition of hiring and promotion. (David Robinson, “EDI Statements: A Threat to Academic Freedom?” CAUT Bulletin, Vol. 70, No. 6, September-October, 2023, p.7) When DEI becomes an imposed public confession of faith it is indeed a threat to the mission of the university as an institution of free, open inquiry and argument. And it is not only administrations that are to blame here. Kotkin and Williams are right to focus attention on students and (mostly younger) academics for mobilizing against perspectives and people with whom they disagree. There have been too many instances of talks being cancelled, colleagues being publicly shamed, mobbed, and fired, for articulating positions that run afoul of left-liberal orthodoxy. George Elliot Clarke, Professor of English at the University of Toronto and past poet laureate of the City of Toronto sums up the problem: “It is cowardice and hypocrisy to pretend that the only threat to ourselves arises from Neanderthal administrators or authoritarian (foreign) governments or states, We also need to reject forthrightly censorship calls from both leftist and rightist, self-righteous “activists” as well as from their often nicely tenured allies who will okay bullying tactics so long as the Putsches are conducted against persons whose ideas they dispute.” (George Elliot Clarke, “Letter to the Editor, CAUT Bulletin, Vol. 70, No. 6, September-October 2023, p. 18). Such efforts are a direct threat to the university as a space for open inquiry and argument. Those who insist on the need for ideological conformity are free to resign their academic position and start a revolutionary party. Otherwise, tolerance and the unforced force of the better argument (Habermas) must prevail on campus.

But that principle cuts both ways. Curriculum reform, questioning and opening the canon, exposing the ideological and social forces that shape the disciplines, exposing the role of economic and political power in the determination of what counts as legitimate knowledge production, and allowing free play and learning to listen to formerly silenced voices is actually the best of what the university is. What have the best artists, philosophers, and scientists done over history other than break free of imposed orthodoxies that had become barriers to the growth of knowledge and the creation of beauty? That is what Copernicus, Bacon, Descartes, and Galileo did with regard to Aristotelian physics, that is what Einstein did with regard to Newtonian mechanics, and it is what critical race theorists and feminists and Marxists and anti-colonial scholars are doing today when they deploy their analyses to promote the growth of knowledge rather than obfuscate material reality.

Is the human intellect constricted or expanded when it listens to the voices of the colonized speak about their experiences? Is out literary sensibility constricted or expanded when we read literature in English written by authors from outside England? There is too much of the middle-aged scold in arguments like Kotkin’s and Williams.’ One fears that they would have been on the side of the salon directors who refused to show Impressionist works, or amongst the stampede of outraged concert goers fleeing Stravinski’s Sacre de Printemps, or nodding in agreement with Einstein’s rejection of quantum mechanics. But God does play dice with the universe, paintings do not have to be constructed on the basis of Renaissance theories of perspective, poems do not have to rhyme, and philosophy can criticize traditional standards of objectivity and truth. Science does not thereby cease to be science, painting and poetry art, or philosophy critical engagement with knowledge claims in the service of the goal of understanding our world in all of its aspects as broadly and deeply as we are capable of understanding it.

This Time Will be Different, Right?

In a rare act of political intelligence, Bashar al-Assad fled Syria rather than prolonging a probably futile fight to save his regime and life. Does this portend a better result for the Syrian people than the Libyan or Iraqi? The victorious rebel leader Ahmed al-Sharaa has also shown some political intelligence, saying all the right things, that the victory of the rebel forces is a victory for all Syrians and promising to respect the rights of minority communities. Thus far the transfer of power has been as disciplined as possible given that it comes at the end of a 13 year civil war. The government stepped down, the rebel forces have been ordered to respect state institutions, to refrain from looting and destroying public property, and to withdraw from heavily populated urban areas.

Most analysts that I have read were surprised by the rapidity of the regime collapse, but with two weeks of hindsight perhaps it was not so surprising as it initially appeared. The leading rebel group, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham was supported by Turkiye while Assad’s main backers, Russia and Iran, could not or were not willing to expend the resources necessary to blunt the rebel advance. Iran has over-extended itself in its conflict with Israel and Russia remains in a brutal slog against Ukrainian forces almost three years after its invasion. The Syrian army, now mostly poorly paid conscripts, clearly refused to fight. If only that had been the case thirteen years ago. Political wisdom, it seems, like Hegel’s Owl of Minerva, spreads its wings only at the falling of the dusk.

It also remains stoically silent. The fall of one autocrat teaches other autocrats nothing. Gadhaffi watched Saddam fall, but fought to the end. Assad watched Hussein and Gadhaffi fall and ultimately fled, but not before killing hundreds of thousands in the civil war and forcing millions of others to flee as refugees. One wishes that they if they were going to go, they would go before destroying the lives and life-conditions of their people for generations.

But now Assad is gone. Al-Sharaa is playing the role of the wise statesperson well. Is he sincere? Is he merely trying to build credibility with the foreign powers– and there are many (Iran, Israel, Russia, Turkiye, and the United States)– who hold the future stability of Syria in their hands? Is he buying time before eliminating rival factions? We will find out in the coming weeks and months. But the bigger problem than his intentions is whether he will be able to control the internal and external situation. What the Syrian people seem to be clamouring for more than anything at the moment is peace: time to breath and think about their future free from fear and intimidation by one side or another. The political signs, whatever al-Sharaa’s intentions, do not encourage hope that Syrians will get what they most need right now.

The streets of Damascus were full of cheering Syrians, understandably overjoyed by the collapse of the regime. Horror stories spilled out of the political prisons in which former dissidents and rebels were held and tortured. Hands flashed peace signs and faces remembered how to smile. But across the country Israel was destroying stocks of strategic weapons, air defences, and advancing into the buffer zone created by the treaty that ended the Yom Kippur war. Russia was securing its naval and air bases, while the United States was bombing what it said were Daesh positions in the east. In the North, Turkish sponsored forces were attacking Kurdish militias even as refugees streamed back into Syria.

It is impossible for those of us who live in politically stable countries to imagine what it is like to live in a environment in which at any time a foreign military can start bombing or shelling or launch an incursion. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham did nothing to resist the destruction of the Syrian military’s strategic weaponry nor did it act against American encampments in the south. It spokesperson wisely demurred when asked what its position on the Israeli incursion was. Perhaps they have learned the lesson that Hamas (and Hezbollah and Iran) have been learning painfully over the past year. It is politically insane to wage a primarily military struggle against vastly superior military forces. If their goal really is stability and reconstruction then they will have to arrive at and maintain a modus vivendi with all the major powers in the region, regardless of their ideological commitments.

Arriving at an agreement with Turkiye should be easiest, since they are Hayat Tahrir al-Shamm’s main sponsor. Nevertheless. if they really do want to represent all Syrians, they will have to end the fighting between the Turks and Kurds, and it is not clear how they could do that, if the Kurds choose to keep fighting (and why would they stop, so long as they are attacked and their national aspirations unfulfilled?) How will Russia react to the threat to its bases in Syria? These are vital to projecting Russian power into Africa and maintaining the laughable facade that Putin has constructed as an anti-imperialist. Does Russia have enough money to pay the rebels off to secure the future of their installations? It is unlikely that Russia would enter into an armed conflict against forces with a high degree of popular legitimacy at the moment, but if they have no money or Hayat Tahrir al-Sham won’t be bought off, how far will Putin go to protect these assets?

Even more worrisome for the new regime is Iran. All the analysts that I have read agree that Iran is the major loser in the fall of Assad. Al-Sharaa stated explcitly that the new regime will not tolerate Iranian interference in Syrian affairs. But without that cooperation,Iran will have extreme diff iculty re-arming Hezbollah. How far are they willing and able to go to undermine the new regime? They are not going to invade, but they are skilled in covert operations and must still have allies in the Alawite power structure and military. Can they accept defeat and walk away, even if it means abandoning Hezbollah? That would be the politically wise move: Iranians elected a reformer and are demanding concrete steps to improve their living conditions. But inertia and path dependency often trump intelligence in international relations.

Iran’s next moves will also be influenced by its knowledge that if it and Hezbollah are the main losers then Israel (and the US) are the strategic winners. Israel is sending a very clear message to the new regime: we retain overwhelming military superiority and can destroy whatever is left in the country. The United States has celebrated the fall of Assad. But Hayat Tahrir al-Shama has its origins in al-Qaeda and remains a designated terrorist group. There are still US forces on the ground. How will the US and Israel behave long term towards a terrorist group if they should end up forming the next government of Syria? On the other side, how will an Islamist government (terrorist or not) relate to Israel and the United States? If they ignore Palestinians, how can they claim that their victory is a victory for the whole Islamic nation? If they intervene, even with only ideological support, how will they avoid the wrath of Israel and the United States? Thus far they have chosen silence in favour of stabilizing their own country. But missionary fervor is probably drowning out clear reason in the heads of some members of the Islamist movements. Will al-Sharaa be able to keep the most radical forces in his own movement under control?

Hamas seems hopeful that the fact that the victorious movement is Sunni will lead them to eventually offer some sort of support. If so, they have become even more delusional over the course of the war than they were when they launched the self-destructive attack on Israel on October 7th, 2023. I argued at the time that Iran and Hezbollah were not going to help them achieve the strategic victory they hoped they would. Iran and Hezbollah have been decisively weakened. A young government with its eyes focussed on domestic problems will not be keep to intervene in a doomed military struggle. But even if they did, without air defences (the fatal weakness of the so-called ‘axis of resistance’) they would accomplish nothing accept the further destruction of the country that they are promising to rebuild.

The final question concerns whether they will be able to re-build the country and create the political, social, economic, and cultural conditions for national unity. Western commentators have largely celebrated Assad’s fall but judged Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s Islamism a permanent obstacle towards achieving the goals of national reconciliation and progress. Some suspect that al-Sharaa’s conversion from terrorist to national liberation fighter to peaceful politician is a ruse. Perhaps. But Islamism and fundamentalist terrorism are not identical and there are other examples of Islamist movements consciously rejecting violence after advocating and practicing it. The best example is the conversion of Egypt’s al-Gama’ah al-Islamiyah, whose leadership ultimately rejected violent struggle without renouncing its fundamentalist interpretation of the primacy of Islamic law and the need for theocratic rule. What they rejected was the terrorist principle that religious rule could be imposed by force. If the people are not ready for religious rule then trying to impose it would be both unjust and impossible. (See Sherman A. Jackson, “Islam and Peace: A Muslim Fundamentalist Perspective,” Peace Movements in Islam, Juan Cole, ed). Will Hayat Tahrir al-Sham undergo a similar conversion? Perhaps, but there is an important difference. Egypt’s al-Gama’ah al-Ilamiyah were the losers in a long struggle with the Egyptian state. Their conversion to non-violence occurred in prison. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has just won the civil war. Victorious movements which see themselves as doing God’s (or History’s) work are rarely capable of the sorts of compromises that politics on earth requires. Those who would build (or prepare) the City of God on earth (whether Christian, or Jewish, or Muslim) are not looking in the right direction. They look up in order to build down below, whereas they need to look into the eyes of their fellow citizens and see them first as fellow human beings. That look of recognition is possible from different religious perspectives, but I cannot see how it is possible from any fundamentalist religious perspective. If Islam (or Jesus, or Yahweh) is the truth then those who belong to different faith communities or atheists who reject the truth of them all cannot but appear to be inferior. They might be tolerated, but how can they be regarded as equal?

Syrian socialists and feminists have joined in the celebrations unleashed by Assad’s fall, but are far more circumspect about the near term future of the country under its new fundamentalist leadership. Swiss-Syrian socialist Joseph Daher cautions that:”it is still an open question as to whether HTS will follow through on these statements. The  organization has been an authoritarian and reactionary organization with an Islamic fundamentalist ideology, and still has foreign fighters within its ranks. Many popular demonstrations in the past few years have occurred in Idlib against its rule and violations of political freedoms and human rights, including assassinations and torture of opponents. It is not enough to tolerate religious or ethnic minorities or allow them to pray. The key issue is recognizing their rights as equal citizens participating in deciding the future of the country. More generally, statements by the head of HTS, al-Jolani, such as “people who fear Islamic governance either have seen incorrect implementations of it or do not understand it properly,” are definitely not reassuring, but quite the opposite.” That concern is amplified amongst revolutionary Syrian women. Writing in the Guardian Mona Eltahawy quotes Razan Zaitouneh, disappeared by the Assad regime in 2013, who warned against naive or opportunistic hopes that there was any important political differences between Assad’s technocratic and the Islamist’s religious terror:”We did not do a revolution and lose thousands of souls so that such monsters can come and repeat the same unjust history,” she wrote to her friend and fellow human rights activist Nadim Houry, in an email dated May 2013. “These people need to be held to account just like the regime.” What good would it do to replace one oppressor with a different one?”It would do no good at all.

Unfortunately, the victory of the rebel forces emphasizes once again the extreme weakness of the Left in the Arab world. In the West, the Left in power is synonymous with over-caution and practical betrayal of working class interests. In the Arab world, it is synonymous with authoritarian personal rule and top-down dirigiste state control of the economy. The promises made in the early days of Nasserism in Egypt and Baathism in Syria and Iraq failed to deliver shared wealth, universal education, and secular-socialist national solidarity. As in Iran in 1979, a movement which thinks that the solution to all life’s problems is found in a single book written 1500 years ago has the revolutionary initiative, weakening further the link between the practice of revolution and the value of social progress beyond “ancient, venerable prejudices” (Marx, Communist Manifesto). How can they lead a complex, pluralist society with a long history of secular (albeit violent and authoritarian rule) into the future?

The virtue of secular as opposed to religious rule is that the later can allow individuals to fully and freely develop their religious sentiments and rituals while leaving state institutions as public frameworks of interaction that do not rest on any sectarian basis. A theocracy, by contrast, cannot allow the full and free development of non-religious forms of life. The separation of Churches and state does not eliminate churches but allows for religious freedom in the private and non-political public sphere (civil society). But a fundamentalist religious regime can tolerate social and religious differences but cannot recognize their equal value. If a regime is fundamentalist then it will insist on the incorporation of its values into social fundamentals, especially law and education. Again, this problem is not unique to Islamic fundamentalism, but it is posed with extreme urgency today in Syria, where a generation’s hopes for revolutionary liberation are now threatened not by failure to overthrow the regime but success.